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If a particular facility complies with the dissolved oxygen standard or a
Fish and Game Code provision, we tend to conclude that is good enough.
Well, no, it is not.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Empirical evidence suggests that diversion of instream flows for
human use, coupled with the potential impacts of changing climatic
conditions, is threatening the sustainability of aquatic life.' Global
warming models suggest many areas will be subject to climatic extremes,
1. The Public Trust Doctrine and Ripanan and Appropnative Water Rights, State and
Public Interest Perspectives-Panel Discussion, i THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND ITS
APPLICATION To PROTECTING INSTREM FLOWS: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP 42 (Gary E. Smith
& Alexander R. Hoar eds., 1999), http://www.sf.adfg.state.ak.us/nifpa/NIFPA-ReporL08.pdf
(statement of Richard Roos-Collins, National Heritage Institute) (discussing orientation of
regulatory community as unacceptably rigid and code-based).
2. See, e.g., Michael J. Fumiss et al., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Forest Serv., Climate Change
Res. Ctr., Water Resources and Climate Change (May 20, 2008), http://www.fs.fed.us/ccrc/topics/
water.shtml.
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including more frequent, intense floods and lengthier droughts.'
Additionally, water usage has increased dramatically in recent decades in
light of steady population growth and expanded commercial uses.'
These elevated demands are creating significant challenges for
those natural resource managers charged with protecting fish and
wildlife both within and surrounding instream corridors Failure to
preserve sufficient instream flows can result in a variety of harmful
effects, including reduced marine habitats, lower seafood production,
higher concentrations of pollutants in waters utilized for human
consumption, and diminished capacity of waterways to support
recreational activities such as fishing, boating, and swimming.'
. Several states merely prevent stream flows from being reduced
below the "7Q,0 flow"--that is, the average flow during the driest
consecutive seven-day period that has a likelihood of recurring only once
every ten years.7 These policies exist despite the fact that, for over twenty
years, the 7Q, formula has faced considerable criticism across a variety
of disciplines.! There is overwhelming consensus among the scientific
community that 7Q 0 merely preserves water quality standards by
calculating the concentration of pollutants in point source discharges
without considering water quantity and numerous other core principles of
instream management.9
Specifically, a variety of studies suggest that the 7Q,0 formula,
applied uniformly throughout the year, fails to reflect the seasonally
variable natural flow of rivers that is vital to fish habitat, feeding, and
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. DANA W SEERLEY ET AL., CARL VINSON INST. OF GOV'T, UNIV. OF GA., BALANCING
INSTREAM AND OFFSTREAM USES: INSTREAM FLOWS, SURFACE STORAGE AND AQUIFER
MANAGEMENT 22-23 (2006), http://www.cviog.uga.edu/services/policy/environmental/policy
reportslbalanceinstream.pdf (citing NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., THE
SCIENCE OF INSTREAM FLOWS: A REVIEW OFTHE TEXAS INSTREAM FLOW PROGRAM (2005)).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 14.
8. See, e.g., id. at 31; JAMES M. EVANS & RUSSELL H. ENGLAND, A RECOMMENDED
METHOD To PROTECT INSTREAM FLOWS IN GEORGIA 3 (1995) (citing Donald Leroy Tennant,
Instream Flow Regimens for Fish, Wildlife, Recreation and Related Environmental Resources, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM AND SPECIAL CONFERENCE ON INSTREAM FLOW NEEDS 359-73
(1976)); Clair B. Stalnaker, The Use of Habitat Strcture Preferenda for Establishing Regimes
Necessary for Maintenance of Fish Habitat in THE ECOLOGY OF REGULATED STREAMS 321-37
(1979); Thomas A. Wesche & Paul A. Rechard, A Summary of Instream Methods for Fisheries
and Related Research Needs; in 9 EISENHOWER CONSORTIUM BULL. 1-121 (1980); N.C. DIV. OF
WATER RES., PROTECTING INSTREAM FLOWS IN NORTH CAROLINA 1-58 (1992)).
9. See, eg, Donald L. Tennant, Instream Flow Regimes for Fish, Wildlife, Recreation
andRelated Environmental Resources, 1 FISHERIES 6, 6-10 (1976).
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reproduction.'" High flows are necessary to flush sediments and waste,
as well as recharge the system's fertility by infusing the waterway with
nutrients; intermediate flows prevent the stranding of eggs and provide
adequate oxygenation for life development; and low, but not stagnant,
flows preserve adequate waste capacity and prevent overcrowding of fish
populations."
The protection of instream flows preserves water management
options for future generations, and a varied size structure and level of
species diversity is reflective of a healthy fish assemblage, which
provides a measurable indication of watershed condition." Do states
have an affirmative common law, or judicially mandated, duty to these
future generations beyond the strictures of their water codes to protect the
sustainability of watercourses to support freshwater and marine life in the
face of growing stresses on these resources?
The common law public trust doctrine recognizes that the public has
particular inalienable rights to certain natural resources and provides that
these resources are held in trust for the benefit and use of all people.'3
Hawai'i, in a landmark 2000 decision by the state's supreme court in In
re Water Use Permit Applications ( Wai'ahole ),1" became the first
regulated riparian state to recognize explicitly that the public trust
10. SeeTOMANNEARETAL., INSTREAM FLOWS FOR RESOURCE STEWARDSHIP 131 (Rev. ed.
2004); GA. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., INTERiM INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION STRATEGY 26 (2001)
("[A]ithough DNR's 7Q,0 rule is designed to protect water quality, it is NOT based on the science
of how much water should remain in a stream to maintain a healthy aquatic community.");
Christopher C. Estes & John E Orsborn, Review and Analysis of Methods for Quantifying
Instream Flow Requirements, 22 WATER RES. BULL. 389-98 (1986); James S. Bulak & Gerrit J.
Jobsis III, South Carolina Instream Flow Studies: A Status Report 1-51 (1989); Donald J. Orth &
Paul M. Leonard, Comparison of Discharge Methods and Habitat Optimization for
Recommending Insteam Flows To Protect Fish Habitat 5 REGULATED RIVERS: RES. & MGMT.
129-3 8 (1990); Bradford Bowman, Instram Flow Regulation. Plugging the Holes in Maine s
WaterLaw, 54 ME. L. REv. 287, 307 (2002) (describing Maine's interim policy of relying on 7Q,
as showing "no consideration for either the natural hydrograph or the seasonal needs of the
riverine ecosystem").
11. Donald J. Orth & Paul M. Leonard, Comparison of Dischatge Methods and Habitat
Optimization for Recommending Instream Flows To Protect Fish Habitat 5 REGULATED RIVERS:
RESOURCES & MGMT. 129-38 (1990).
12. See ANNEAR ET AL., supra note 10, at 84; The Nature Conservancy, Rivers & Lakes:
Cover Story-The Threats to Freshwater Wildlife, http://www.nature.org/earth/rivers/coverstory.
html (last visited Nov. 8, 2008) ("The world's great rivers and their interconnect[ed] habitats
provide an array of ecological services that support us. They purify water, control floods and
provide abundant food sources. But our changes to river systems are causing more people to
experience poor water quality, scarcity of water, increased flooding and low levels of native fishes
and birds for food.").
13. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law.
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970). Sax's article is the seminal work
addressing the modem day public trust.
14. 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000).
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doctrine operates independently of the state's legislatively pronounced
water code.'" Since that time, several commentators have suggested that
Hawai'i's approach could assist mainland states facing an urgent need to
move proactively, rather than waiting to react to imminent water conflicts
and crises. 6
However, there is little evidence that the Wai'ahole, I decision has
played any appreciable role in addressing water quantity issues in the
many regulated riparian jurisdictions in the eastern United States, where,
as in Hawai'i, state governments administer comprehensive water
withdrawal and water management programs that allow diversions for
certain uses.' This Article suggests that the Hawai'i high court's decision
can function as the foundation for a conceptual framework in which the
15. See id Various competing theories have emerged with respect to the wisdom and
validity of utilizing the public trust doctrine to protect instream flows in states that follow an
appropriative rights system of water allocation, where the first, or "senior," user of a water source
is afforded priority over subsequent, or "junior," users. See geneially Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v.
Superior Court, 658 R2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (extending public trust to California's nonnavigable
waters above mean high water line because diversion of these waters would affect navigable
waters downstream); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247
N.W2d. 457 (N.D. 1976) (declaring that the public trust doctrine includes water conservation);
Ralph Johnson, Public TrustProtection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REV.
233 (1980) (asserting that public trust doctrine can place limits on water extraction in
appropriative rights states); Jan S. Stevens, Pblic Trust and Instream Uses, 19 ENVTL. L. 605
(1989) (addressing California stream flows); Scott W Reed, Fish Gotta Swim: Establishing Legal
Rights to Instream Flows Through the Endangered Species Act and the Public Trust Doctrine, 28
IDAHO L. Rv. 645 (1992) (addressing Idaho stream flows); Matt Clifford, Comment, Preserving
Stream Flows in Montana Through the Constitutional Public Trust Doctine. An Underrated
Solution, 16 PuB. LAND L. REv. 117 (1995) (addressing Montana stream flows); Craig Anthony
Arnold & Leigh A. Jewel, Litigation Bounded Effectiveness and the Real Public Trust Doctrine:
TheAtermath of the Mono Lake Case, 14 HASTINGS W-N.W J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 1177 (2008)
(contending that judicial application of public trust doctrine is ineffective when compared to
postlitigation conflict resolution between competing parties).
16. See, e.g., Denise E. Antolini, Water Rights and Responsibilities in the Twemnty-First
Century: A Foreword to the Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawai'i Public
Trust Doctrine, 24 U. HAw. L. REv. 1,3 (2001); Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing
Hawai'i's Public Trust Doctrine 39 (2001), http://www.hawaii.edu/uhreview/publictrust.pdf
(statement of Timothy Johns) (suggesting future applications of public trust doctrine will
demonstrate that the Hawai'i Supreme Court's decision in Wai'ahole Iwas "cutting edge"); Keala
C. Ede, He K5M wai Pono no ka Wai (A Just Law for Water): The Application and Implications
of the Public Trust Doctrine, in In reWater Use Permit Applications, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 283, 311-
14 (2002) (suggesting that Wailahole Imay have significant influence in expanding the public
trust doctrine in other jurisdictions).
17. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Governing Water. The Semicommons of Fluid Property
Rights, 50 ARiz. L. REV. 445, 454 (2008); Kirt Mayland, Navigating the Murky Waters of
Connecticut. Water Allocation Scheme, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 685, 691-98 (2006); Joseph W
Dellapenna, Special Challenges to Water Markets in Ripaian State.% 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 305,
336-37 (2004); JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER REsouRcEs 76-80 (3d ed.
2000).
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public trust doctrine serves as an independent operative in instream flow
protection in select regulated riparian states.
Eighteen states have adopted some form of regulated riparianism in
place of customary water allocation systems of riparianism or
appropriative rights. 8 To demonstrate the implementation of the,
proposed framework derived from Wai'ahole I, this Article applies the
framework to the current approach to instream flow protection in
Mississippi, which utilizes the 7Q,0 standard. While Mississippi has not
faced the statewide water shortages that many other states in the
southeast region, including Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, have recently
suffered,'9 the current state policy for preserving instream flows appears
inadequate nonetheless and serves as a model test subject.
To set the stage for construction of the proposed framework and its
potential application in Mississippi, Part II of this Article discusses
Mississippi's conversion to a regulated riparian system in the mid-1980s.
Part II also outlines Mississippi's current agency structure for managing
instream flows in accordance with federal and state statutory and
regulatory law. Part HI reveals the need for immediate action in
Mississippi by reviewing the fundamental aspects of instream flow
management and documenting the failures of the state's 7Q,0
methodology in light of the contemporary and projected stresses on the
state's waterways.
Parts IV and V develop the conceptual framework for independent
operation of the public trust doctrine based upon the principles espoused
in the Hawai'i decision and apply it to Mississippi's current water
allocation system. The threshold question for whether this framework
may be useful to a particular regulated riparian state is whether or not the
state's judiciary recognizes both the history and evolving nature of a
strong public trust beyond its traditional notions. Therefore, Part IV
18. See, e.g., Dale B. Thompson, Of Rainbows and Rivers: Lessons for
Telecommunications Spectrum Policy from Transitions in Property Rights and Commons in
Water Law, 54 BuFF. L. REv. 157, 191 (2006) (citing SAX'ET AL., supra note 17, at 79) (listing
regulated riparian states of Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawai'i,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina,
New York, Virginia, and Wisconsin); see also Joseph W Dellapenna, The Law of WaterAllocation
in the Southeastern States at the Opening of the Twen(y-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REv. 9, 33 (2002); Debra L. Freeman, Introductio, in WATER RIGHTS OF THE EASTERN UNITED
STATES 1, 3 (Kenneth W Wright ed., 1998).
19. See U.S. GEOLOGIC SERV., WATER WATCH, http://water.usgs.gov/waterwatch/ (last
visited Jan. 30, 2009) (documenting real-time streamflow rates across the United States compared
to historical streamflow); see also, e.g., Tammy L. Shaw, Sharing Water in Alabama, Georgia and
Florida: An Update on the Ti-State Water War, 21 WATER LOG 10, 10-11 (2001); Dellapenna,
supra note 18, at 86 n.596.
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outlines Mississippi's common law obligations to her people as the
trustee of particular natural resources under the state's broad and
continually developing public trust doctrine.
Beyond this threshold question, this Article contends in Part V that
for the public trust doctrine to play a significant role in a regulated
riparian state, as Wai'ahole Iindicates, the state's courts must: (1) show
a willingness to adopt a higher level of scrutiny when public trust
resources are at stake than the traditional deference afforded to agency
decisions, (2) recognize that the state's codification of the trust by state
statute or regulatory code does not eradicate or subsume any function for
common law public trust principles, and (3) regard the doctrine as a
mandatory obligation as opposed to a voluntary authority.
Part V then analyzes whether or not recent rulings by Mississippi's
judiciary comport with this proposed framework derived from the
Hawai'i decision. It concludes that the public trust doctrine may have
untapped potential as an independent source for preserving instream
flows in Mississippi and conceivably other regulated riparian states, to
avoid ecological degradation in the face of anticipated water shortages.
Part V closes by explaining that those who choose to rely upon the
trust as an independent source will face significant legal hurdles, as
application of the trust is not just an environmental issue, but also a
constitutional one. For this reason, state courts will need to grapple with
constitutional issues, such as separation of powers, takings jurisprudence,
and standing. Part VI concludes with a discussion of the remaining role
for balancing tests in states that recognize the trust as an operative
independent of codified water regimes.
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR INSTREAM FLOW MANAGEMENT
Traditionally, the eastern part of the United States governed water
allocation through riparianism, while the west favored the prior
appropriation doctrine." Subpart A of this Part addresses these
traditional water rights systems, while Subpart B analyzes the conversion
undertaken by Mississippi and many other states to a modified system
known as regulated riparianism.
20. See Freeman, supm note 18.
2009]
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A. Traditional WaterRights Systems
Subparts 1 and 2 summarize the traditional water rights allocation
systems of riparianism and prior appropriation, respectively, and the
inherent problems associated with each regime.
1. Riparian Rights
Since at least the dawn of the nineteenth century, eastern states
generally adhered to a riparian rights structure, whereby the owner of
land affronting a waterway had the right to a continued flow of that water
and utilization of it.2' In most jurisdictions, over time, a riparian owner's
common law right to make use of the watercourse in its natural state
(natural flow theory) transitioned to allow reasonable use of the
watercourse (reasonable use theory) in light of legal, economic and
weather-related developments." Reasonable use protects not the
21. See Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F Cas. 472, 474 (D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312) ("Prima facie
every proprietor upon each bank of a river is entitled to the land, covered with water, in front of
his bank, to the middle thread of the stream, or, as it is commonly expressed, usque ad filum
aquae. In virtue of this ownership he has a right to the use of the water... But, strictly speaking,
he has no property in the water itself; but a simple use of it, while it passes along."); James
Christman, Ripan'an Doctrine, in WATER RIGHTS OF THE UNITED STATES 21 (Kenneth Wright ed.,
1998); Eva Morreale Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jetsey, 22 RUTGERS L. REv 621, 628-29
(1968). For a detailed discussion of the origins of riparian rights prior to the colonization of
America, see Joseph W Dellapenna, The Development and Persistence of Ria'aian Right; in 1
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.01-.01(a) (Robert E. Beck ed., 2007 repl. vol.); Anthony Scott &
Georgina Coustalin, The Evolution of Water Rights, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 821 (1995).
22. See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W2d 129, 132-34 (Ark. 1955) (applying rationale
for reasonable use approach); MORTON HORWLTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860, at 33-53 (1977) (discussing changes that dams and mills had on nineteenth-century
water law, including initiating shift to reasonable use); Richard Ausness, Water Rights Legislation
in the East.- A Program for Reform, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 547, 549 (1983) [hereinafter
Ausness, Water Rigbts Legislation in the Eas4 (noting that reasonable use rule is employed in
majority of riparian states); E.P. Krauss, The Legal Form ofLiberalism: A Study of Rtoatan and
Nuisance Law in Nineteenth Century Ohio, 18 AKRON L. REv. 223, 229-30 (1984) (stating that
Ohio courts abandoned natural flow and adopted reasonable use due to industrialization); Carol
M. Rose, Energy Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 261, 267-73 (1990) (describing the shift in England from "ancient uses" after introduction
of mills). But see Theodore Lauer, The Common Law Backgmund of the Riparian Doctine, 28
Mo. L. REv. 60, 60-61 (1963) (suggesting that the riparian rights system originated on theory of
reasonable use). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A, introductory note (1979)
(providing list of traditional factors utilized in determining whether a use is reasonable). The
natural flow theory differentiates "consumptive uses' such as drinking and bathing, from
"artificial uses:' such as irrigation, mining and large-scale watering of livestock, allowing
interference with the natural flow only for the former. See Richard Ausness, Water Rights, the
Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 407, 416
[hereinafter Ausness, Protecdon of Insfanr Uses].
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customary historical flow of a watercourse, but rather the equal right of
all contiguous riparian owners to use the water."
In instances in which water is limited in a riparian system, the
judiciary has fashioned, at times, pro rata shared solutions among legal
users.24  In balancing competing uses, courts generally are loathe to
consider noneconomic uses, leading to the rather unpredictable and
alarming possibility that a long-term established use could lose priority
to a new, commercial venture.2 ' Further, this balancing often protects
only those recreational or environmental resources that correspond to one
or both competitors' economic interests.26
When nonnative populations first inhabited those states west of the
Mississippi River as territories, they commonly imported this traditional
riparian rights doctrine.27 However, the new western mining, timber, and
farming economies had two primary concerns with the riparian system:
(1) the exploitation of water resources under the riparian system
produced uncertainty in capital investments, as subsequent users could
preempt current users simply by proposing a new use that resulted in a
greater net economic benefit;28 and (2) the new industries became
23. See, e.g., Lukis v. Ray, 888 N.E.2d 325, 330-31 (Ind. App. 2008); Panetta v. Equity
One, Inc., 920 A.2d 638, 644 (N.J. 2007); Joseph W Dellapenna, The Right To Consume Water
Under 'ure"Rp oanan Rights; n 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 21, § 7:41-52.
24. See, e.g., Lastinger v. Toyah Valley Irrigation Co., 167 S.W 788, 791 (Tex. App.
1914) ("[Iln case of shortage of water from drought, accident or other cause, the water to be
distributed shall be divided among all consumers pro rata, according to the amount he or they
may be entitled to, to the end that all shall suffer alike, and preference be given to none."); Cozy
Lake, Inc. v. Nyoda Girls' Camp, 131 A. 892 (N.J. 1926) (suggesting proportional allotment
during peak drought conditions); Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 306 S.W2d 111, 115 (Ark.
1957) (holding that competing users have a "correlative right" to the use of water to the "extent
of a reasonable share" during water shortage); see also Dellapenna, supra note 17, at 316 ("When
pro rata sharing among competing users is possible, courts, under the reasonable use rule, have
preferred it as the fairest resolution when there is a limited amount of water."); Steven T. Miano &
Michael E. Crane, Eastern Water Law: Historical Perspectives and Emerging Trends, 18 NAT.
REsouRcEs & ENV'T 14, 16 (2003) (discussing uncertainties of pro rata sharing via litigation).
But see Joseph W Dellapenna, Developing a Suitable WaterAllocation Law for Pennsylvani4 17
VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 11 (2006) ("[Pro rata sharing] is not always possible.... In such cases,
choices must be made to cut off one user altogether so that another riparian might continue to use
the water.").
25. See Dellapenna, supra note 17, at 316-17. In addition to a lack of resources on the
part of small water users to engage in litigation, the system necessarily favors larger water users
because the resultant economic impact to the large user generally outweighs any converse loss on
the part of the smaller user. See id at 319; Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the Eas4 supra
note 22, at 553.
26. See Ausness, Protection ofnstrram Uses; supra note 22, at 418.
27. Theodore E. Lauer, Reflection onRipananism, 35 Mo. L. REv. 1,3 (1970).
28. SeeIn reWaters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 665-66 (Cal. 1979)
(citing California legislature's efforts to inject surety in water use investment by eliminating
riparianism, a "principal source of [the] uncertainty"); Pleasant Valley Canal Co. v. Borror, 72
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dependent on the diversion of water to properties that did not abut
waterways,29  which the courts in riparian jurisdictions necessarily
considered an unreasonable use in light of the fact that the right itself
arose only through the riparian nature of the property." From these
burgeoning markets in the arid west arose the common law system of
appropriative rights.
2. Appropriative Rights
The central component of this private property-based structure is its
temporal nature. Regardless of the proximity of the ultimate water use to
the relevant water source, the first user of water attains an appropriation
right as the superior user, with all subsequent users assuming relative
junior status.' Many attribute this course to a simple reality one scholar
dubbed the "Great Thirst": miners of the mid- 1800s trespassed on native
western lands without an organized federal government in place and
diverted the water they needed.32 However, while the regime's common
Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 24 (Ct. App. 1998); Lauer, supm note 27, at 15; Richard S. Harnsberger,
Prescriptive WaterRights in Wisconsin, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 47, 60 (1961). Butsee Proceedings of
the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawai'i's Public Trust Doctrine, supa note 16, at 61
(statement of Jan Stevens) (suggesting that water uses generate a false sense of certainty that
users are not entitled to in light of today's water shortages).
29. Richard Roos-Collins, Riparian and Appropriative Water Rights Systems-Hybrid
States, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION To PROTECTING
INSTREAM FLOWS, supra note 1, at 7 (stating that some canal systems in present-day California
extended more than ten miles to facilitate the gold rush); see also Ausness, Protection ofinstream
Uses, supra note 22, at 419 (distinguishing appropriative rights in that they are not restricted to
riparian owners).
30. See, e.g., Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 88 P. 978, 980 (Cal. Ct. App. 1907)
("Land which is not within the watershed of the river is not riparian thereto, and is not entitled, as
riparian land, to the use or benefit of the water from the river... "); Dellapenna, supra note 21,
§ 746.
31. See, e.g., Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217 (Colo. 1988); State
exrel. Cary v. Cochran, 292 N.W. 239, 242-43 (Neb. 1940); Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. State Bd.
of Control, 578 P.2d 557 (Wyo. 1978); Ralph Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows
and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 233, 257-58 (1980); T. Scribner, Note, Aizona Water
Law. The Problem of Instream Appropriation for Environmental Use by Private Appropriators,
21 Aiz. L. REv. 1095, 1098 (1979); Timothy Conway, Note, National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court: The Expanding Public Trust Doctine, 14 ENVT.L. 617, 627 (1984); Martha E.
Mulvany, State exrel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas: The Misuse oflistory and Precedent in the
Abolition of the Pueblo Water Rights Doctrine in New Mexico, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1089,
1096-97 (2005); Julia S. Waters, Comment, Safeguarding Colorado Water Supply: The New
Congruence of Title Insurance and Water Rights Conveyances, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 491, 493-94
(2006).
32. See NORRIS HUNDLEY, THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER, 1770s--
1990S, at 67-73 (1992); see also, e.g., Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457 (1878) (stating that law
"recognized discovery, followed by appropriation, as the foundation of the possessor's title" and
that miners "were emphatically the law-makers, as respects mining, upon the public lands in the
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moniker "first in time, first in right" sounds rather straightforward,
modem accounting systems implemented to record user priority have
faced significant difficulty in identifying these users and the associated
appropriated quantities.3
In addition to these recordation difficulties, the appropriation
system has faced considerable substantive criticism. As Professor Joseph
Dellapenna has explained, the scheme rejects a basic premise of
introductory economics." During water shortages, the junior user loses
all water rights before the senior user loses any." Therefore, the junior
user loses marginal units of high productivity while a senior user retains
marginal units of low productivity." In addition, appropriative rights
encourage wasteful capital investment and development, as water users
attempt to gain priority over unappropriated waters through excessive
diversions before any need for the water is even established.3
Early in the twentieth century, many western states enacted statutory
or administrative permitting codes in an effort to constrain appropriative
diversion to "beneficial uses" and provide some protection for public
interests in watercourses. 8 However, the principles of these provisions
State"); Joseph W Dellapenna, Dual Systems, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 21,
§ 8:10-11; Dellapenna, supra note 18, at 20-21.
33. See, e.g., A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 76 (1992); Corwin W Johnson, The Challenge of Prescpiptive Water
Rights, 30 TEX. L. REv. 669, 673 (1952); C. Peter Goplerud III, Adjudication of Water Rights, in 2
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 21, § 16:1-7.
34. See Dellapenna, supra note 18, at 24.
35. Id. at 24-25.
36. See Dellapenna, supra note 17, at 323-24 (explaining that risk is not properly
allocated because, during shortages, junior users lose all diversion rights before senior users lose
any). Presumably, this phenomenon could lead to a pure market-based system of water
allocation, where junior users compete to buy surplus water from the senior user. See
Dellapenna, supra note 18, at 25-27. However, these markets have not taken shape for a variety of
reasons. For example, junior users would assert that they are entitled to the water that senior users
are storing and selling.
37. See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 17, at 316-17; Amy Beatie & James Fosnaught, The
City of Golden s Application for Surface Water Rights: A Kayak Course, Instream Flow,
Dilution, or What?, 2 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 273, 282 (1999); Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use,
Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVrL. L.
919, 922 (1998); Steve J. Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A Bluepnint for Change, 61 OR.
L. REv. 483, 486 (1982). The rapid evolution of more efficient technologies that increase
productivity from smaller volumes of water further supports re-examining the historic
justification for a pure prior appropriation system. See, e.g., Robert Benjamin Naeser & Lynne
Lewis Bennett, The Cost of Noncompliance: The Economic Value of Water in the Middle
Arkansas River Valley, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 445 (1998); Sherry J. Tippett & Craig O'Hare,
Using Pnce To Limit Water Use: A Case Study of the City of Santa Fe, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J.
169 (1999).
38. See WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES
491 (1971) (explaining Wyoming's adoption of a water code in 1890); Mark Squillace, Wyoming,
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rarely apply to existing water rights.39 Further, they often fall far short of
serving environmental interests, including the protection of instream
flows to preserve aquatic habitat.
40
in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 1195-1218. Many other states followed
Wyoming's lead, including Nebraska (1895); Idaho and Utah (1903); Nevada, New Mexico, Utah,
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Oklahoma (1905); Oregon (1909);'Texas (1913); California
(1914); Kansas and Washington (1917); and Arizona (1919). See Robert E. Beck, Introduction
and Background, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs, supra note 21, § 11.04(a) n.74.
With respect to the public interest, the Idaho legislature, for example, vested in the director
of the state's Department of Water Resources "considerable authority and discretion to determine
and protect the 'local public interest' when issuing or rejecting water permits." See In re
Application for Permit No. 47-7680, 759 P2d 891, 897 (Idaho 1988) (interpreting IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 42-203A(5)). In Idaho, a determination of what the "public interest" entails, and any
impacts upon it, falls within the discretion of the Department. See Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441,
450 (Idaho 1985). The varied applications of the phrase "public interest" are well beyond the
scope of this article, though a pronouncement by the Wisconsin Supreme Court serves as an
entree into the field.
This term, 'public interest,' is a very broad term, meaning different things in different
connotations.
As to the lakes and streams of this state, it clearly involves the use by the public
"... for all the incidents of navigable waters ... sailing, rowing, canoeing, bathing,
fishing, hunting, skating, and other public purposes." Polluted waters do become less
useful for most, if not all, of such public purposes.
Reuter v. Dep't of Natural Res., 168 N.W2d 860, 861-62 (Wis. 1969) (citing Nekoosa-Edwards
Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 228 N.W 144 (Wis. 1930)).
39. See generally United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n,
247 N.W2d. 457 (N.D. 1976); Neuman, supra note 37. But see Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior
Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (holding that public trust imposes on the state a duty of
"continuing supervision" of trust resources in allocating consumptive water rights to individuals
and municipalities, even where existing but antiquated government allocations to divert Mono
Lake and its tributaries did not give the same credence to public trust rights); Jan S. Stevens,
Public Trust and Instream Uses, 19 ENvrL. L. 605 (1989) (rejecting argument that lack of
commercial navigability of river served to detach state trust obligations in water allocation); see
also Ralph Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stram Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAvIS L.
REv. 233, 257-58 (1980) ("If the public trust doctrine applies to constrain fills which destroy
navigation and other public trust uses in navigable waters, it should equally apply to constrain the
extraction of water that destroys navigation and other public interests. Both actions result in the
same damage to the public interest.").
40. See, e.g., Dan Tarlock, Appropriation for Instream Flow Maintenance: A Progress
Report on 'New'Public Western Waters ght; 1978 UTAH. L. REv. 211, 212 (1978) (stating that
existing appropriative rights regimes focus on consumptive uses at expense of instream uses);
Martha Guy, Note, The Public Trust Doctrine and California Water Law- National Audubon
Society v. Department of Water and Power, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 653, 654 (1982) (same); Scribner,
supra note 31, at 1100 (same). But see El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd.,
142 Cal. App. 4th 937, 966 (Ct. App. 2006) ("[W]hen the rule of priority clashes with the rule
against unreasonable use of water, the latter must prevail. Every effort, however, must be made to
respect and enforce the rule of priority."). Traditionally, water users physically had to divert water
to perfect an appropriation, effectively prohibiting a user from deciding to leave his appropriation
in the stream to preserve flow. See, e.g., Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F
123 (8th Cir. 1913); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 406
P.2d 798 (Colo. 1965); Fullerton v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 518 (Ct. App.
1979). Indeed, early decisions regarded instream uses as improvident because less water would
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B. Conversion to RegulatedRpananism
Traditionally, Mississippi was a purely riparian state, as were most
eastern states." However, as addressed in Subpart 1 below, in 1956,
Mississippi became the only state east of the' Mississippi River to adopt a
dual system encompassing both appropriative and riparian water rights. 2
Subpart 2 explains that thirty years later, Mississippi repealed its
appropriative rights laws and adopted a regulated riparian system. 3
1. An Initial Foray into Appropriation
After localized droughts in the early 1950s, Mississippi adopted a
surface water system of appropriative rights in 1956 that continued to
recognize uses by riparian owners." However, from 1956 to 1985, no
court in the state relied on this appropriative water rights statute to
address conflicting water rights claims. 5 Although it is conceivable that
this simply "reflects a failure to educate the bar and the judiciary on its
existence," the more likely explanation is that the appropriative rights
statute simply did not help to resolve disputes. 6
be available for off-stream uses. See, e.g., Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 166
P3d 309, 310-11 (Utah 1917) (finding attempted appropriation invalid when purpose of enjoining
existing diversion was to feed wild water fowl and allow watercourse to remain in public domain).
But see State ex re. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421 (N.M. 1945)
(finding recreation and fishing beneficial uses); Brasher v. Gibson, 406 P.2d 441 (Ariz. 1965)
(same); Osnes Livestock Co. v. Warren, 62 P.2d 206 (Mont. 1936) (suggesting maintenance of
swimming pool or fish pond is beneficial use). More recently, many western states have adopted
statutes recognizing instream flows for fishing and recreation as "beneficial uses." See, e.g.,
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-151(A) (Supp. 1984-85); CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West Supp.
1985); COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1974); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(4) (1983); OR.
REv. STAT. § 537.170(5)(a) (1985); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.023(a) (Vernon 1972); WASH.
REv. CODE § 90.54.020(1) (1986 Supp.); NEv. REv. STAT. § 533.030(2) (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 61-04-06.1 (Supp. 1983).
41. Dellapenna, supra note 18, at 30; see, e.g., Masonite Corp. v. Windham, 48 So. 2d
622 (Miss. 1950).
42. 1956 MIss. LAws 167; Dellapenna, supmrnote 17, at 336.
43. 1985 Miss. LAWS 459 (currently codified at MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1 to -3-9 (West
2008)); Dellapenna, supra note 17, at 336. Professor Dellapenna coined the phrase "regulated
riparianism" in 1985 to describe water allocation systems based on a public property approach.
See Joseph W Dellapenna, Owning Water in the Eastern United StateWS; in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
6TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE OF EASTERN MINERAL LAw FOuNDAnON 33-34 (1985). The phrase is
generally accepted in the field. See Dellapenna, supra note 18, at 32 n. 134. Many eastern states
currently follow some form of a regulated riparian system. See id at 32 n. 137.
44. See Richard J. McLaughlin, Mississippi, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note
21, at 707.
45. See id; Dellapenna, supra note 18, at 30 n.102.
46. SeeDellapenna, supra note 18, at 30.
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By the time Mississippi adopted this appropriative rights regime,
most consumptive uses of water had begun.47 Thus, in a conflict between
a riparian user and an appropriative user, the riparian user would always
triumph. Courts most often found that either the riparian right would
prevail as an earlier appropriation or the appropriative right would be a
permitted nonriparian use that must fail in competition with a riparian
use."8 The best possible result for an appropriator was for the court to
conduct a balancing test that was little more than the "reasonable use"
test of riparianism."
In light of groundwater shortages in certain parts of the state,
Mississippi's then-Governor William Allain created the State Water
Management Council in 1983.50 In an effort to encourage conjunctive
use of water, the Council determined that surface water and groundwater
should be regulated under the same statutory system.' It recommended
that the legislature repeal the appropriation laws and adopt a permit
system for water diversions. 2 This recommendation led the state to adopt
a regulated riparianism system through the 1985 Omnibus Water
Resource Act. 3 The statute provided that vested rights acquired under
the appropriation statute could be preserved by filing notice within three
years, yet there is no available public record of any person filing such a
notice. 4
2. The Existing Regulated Riparian System
Regulated riparian regimes, bearing some relationship to a system
of public property, ordinarily involve comprehensive statutory water
withdrawal and water management permitting and planning programs.
Under Mississippi's regulated riparian statute, the state has a duty to
47. See McLaughlin, supra note 44, at 707.
48. See Dellapenna, supra note 18, at 30 (citing Anderson-Tully Co. v. Franklin, 307 E
Supp. 539 (ND. Miss. 1969); Haisch v. Southhaven Land Co., 274 E Supp. 392 (N.D. Miss.
1967); Phillips v. Davis Timber Co., 468 So. 2d 72 (Miss. 1985); Black v. Williams, 417 So. 2d
911 (Miss. 1982); Hinds-Rankin Metro. Water Ass'n v. Reid, 256 So. 2d 373 (Miss. 1971);
Downes v. Crosby Chem., Inc., 234 So. 2d 916 (Miss. 1970)).
49. See id
50. See McLaughlin, supranote 45, at 707.
51. Before the mid 1980s, no legislative structure for groundwater management existed,
but for those "capacity use areas," or areas experiencing water shortages, as designated by what is
known today as the state's Department of Environmental Quality. Id. at 707-08.
52. Id at 708.
53. 1985 Miss. LAws 459 (currently codified at MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1 to -9 (West
2008)) ("It is the policy of the Legislature that conjunctive use of groundwater-and surface water
shall be encouraged for the reasonable and beneficial use of all water resources of the state."); see
McLaughlin, supra note 44, at 708.
54. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-5, 51-3-29; Dellapenna, supra note 17, at 336-37.
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promote the general welfare of her people, which requires that the state's
water resources be put to "beneficial use to the fullest extent of which
they are capable."" In order that "the best interests and welfare of the
people are served," the state must "effectively and efficiently manage,
protect and utilize the water resources of Mississippi."56 Maintenance of
instream flow within Mississippi rivers and streams to protect fisheries
and related riverine resources is dependent on the interplay of state
statutory, regulatory, and common law. 7
Subpart a discusses the agency structure for managing instream
flows in Mississippi. Subpart b summarizes the state's role in permitting
water withdrawals and distributing water quality certifications, while
Subpart c addresses the state's function in developing water management
plans across local jurisdictions.
a. Agency Structure for Managing Instream Flows
The Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) is
responsible for protecting the state's air, land, and water through
conservation and the promulgation of environmental regulations that
foster prudent, sustainable economic growth, while improving and
preserving the state's natural resources." The Governor appoints an
Executive Director of the MDEQ and the seven members of the
Commission on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which serves as an
"overseeing authority" for the MDEQ.6
The CEQ is empowered to formulate Department policy, enforce
rules and regulations, receive funding, conduct studies for using the
state's resources, and discharge duties, responsibilities, and powers as
necessary." Specifically, the CEQ has the authority to issue water use
warnings," negotiate interstate water use compacts," formulate the state's
water management plan, ' and address the timing of water withdrawals."
55. MISS. CODEANN. § 51-3-1.
56. Id.
57. While a number of federal statutes, such as the Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
the National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, and the Endangered Species Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-205, play an important role in every state's water policy, the state of Mississippi
derives her instream flow policies primarily from state statutes.
58. Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-7.
59. Id. § 49-2-4(2).
60. Id. § 49-2-5(1); McLaughlin, supm note 45, at 708.
61. Id §§ 49-2-9, 51-3-55(1); see also Am. Sand & Gravel Co. v. Tatum, 620 So. 2d 557,
558 n.2 (Miss. 1993) (describing respective duties of MDEQ and CEQ).
62. MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-11.
63. Id § 51-3-41.
64. Id. §51-3-21(1).
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Separate and apart from the CEQ, the Permit Board, as discussed in
more detail in the next Subpart, takes action on permits administered
through MDEQ under a variety of state and federal water resource, air,
and mining laws.66 By statute, seven members of the nine-member
Permit Board serve by virtue of the state office they hold, while the
Governor appoints the remaining two members.67
The Governor also appoints the executive director of the Mississippi
Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks (MDWFP),"8 as well as the
five members to the Commission on Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks, for
the purposes of conserving, managing and protecting Mississippi's
outdoors, state parks, wildlife, and wildlife habitats.69 The directors of
several state agencies and commissions, including MDWFP and MDEQ,
serve on the Mississippi Water Resources Advisory Council, which
makes recommendations to the Governor and the state legislature on
management of the state's water and water-related land resources."
Both the CEQ and the MDWFP can conduct studies designed to
determine alternative methods of managing the natural wildlife and
fisheries resources of the state, in a manner to ensure efficiency and
maximum productivity." The Water Resources Advisory Council can
also conduct "any studies, analyses or -evaluations related to the state
water management plan."
72
65. Id § 51-3-25(b), (d).
66. Id § 49-17-28.
67. Id.
68. Id § 49-4-6(2).
69. Id. §§ 49-4-4,49-8-9.
70. Id. §51-3-101.
71. Id §§ 49-2-9(d), 49-4-9(c).
72. Id. § 51-3-103(5)(a). Other agencies or departments that play smaller, yet significant
roles, in the state's water policy include -the Bureau of Land and Water Resources, the Mississippi
Development Authority, the Department of Marine Resources, the Department of Agriculture and
Commerce, the Soil and Water Conservation Commission, Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway
Development Authority, Soil and Water Conservation Districts, Watershed Districts, the State
Department of Health, and the Forestry Commission. In addition, the voluntary cooperative
programs under the Mississippi Scenic Streams Stewardship Program (id § 51-4-1) and the
Mississippi Natural Heritage Law of 1978 (id. § 49-5-141) could conceivably provide further
avenues for protecting instream flows. Nonetheless, in spite of the apparent useful participation
by multiple stakeholders as set forth in this Section, the responsibilities are divided amongst these
numerous agencies with little formal coordination for dealing with what is a complex yet single
hydrologic cycle. For example, the permitting agency is separate and distinct from the planning
agency, impeding the effectiveness of any adopted plan. See id § 51-3-3(k)-(1) (permitting
addressed by Permit Board); id. § 51-3-21(1) (planning addressed by Bureau of Land and Water
Resources). One scholar suggests that permitting agencies prefer not to manage water resources
aggressively according to a prepared plan in light of litigation threats. See Dellapenna, supm note
24, at 56.
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b. The Water Permit System
In Mississippi, every person seeking to withdraw surface water
must first obtain a permit from the Permit Board,73 unless specifically
exempted. The Board can issue permits for beneficial uses" of water
"only in excess of the established minimum flow."76  "Established
minimum flow" is "the minimum flow for a given stream at a given point
thereon as determined and established by the [CEQ] when reasonably
required for the purposes of this chapter.""
"Minimum flow" is defined as "the average stream flow rate over
seven (7) consecutive days that may be expected to be reached as an
annual minimum no more frequently than one (1) year in ten (10) years
(7Q 0), or any other stream flow rate that the commission may determine
and establish using generally accepted scientific methodologies
considering biological, hydrological and hydraulic factors."78 If the CEQ
chooses to exercise this authority, it "shall consult with and shall consider
recommendations from the [MDFWP]" and "give consideration to
consumptive and nonconsumptive water uses, including, but not limited
to, agricultural, industrial, municipal and domestic uses, assimilative
73. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-5(1). In accord with its authority under section 51-3-15,
the Permit Board has delegated to the Executive Director of the MDEQ the power to issue,
modify, and revoke permits where controversy has not been exhibited through the public
comment process. In turn, the Executive Director delegated her authority to the Director of the
Office of Land and Water of the MDEQ.
74. A permit is not required for the following exempted uses:
1. The continued use of surface water beginning prior to April 1, 1985 so long as the
person filed a notice of claim with the Commission on Environmental Quality between
1985 and 1988. Id § 51-3-5(2).
2. Domestic purposes, which are defined as "the use of water for ordinary household
purposes, the watering of farm livestock, poultry and domestic animals and the
irrigation of home gardens and lawns." Id §§ 51-3-3(c), 51-3-7(1).
3. Impoundments that are "not located on continuous, free-flowing watercourses." Id
§ 51-3-7(1).
4. Water drawn from a well with a surface casing diameter of less than six inches. Id.
However, a permit is always required for the following:
1. The resale of real property for persons who use water from a well of any size "for
maintaining or enhancing an impoundment of surface water primarily for aesthetic
purposes." Id.
2. Withdrawals of more than 20,000 gallons of water per day, regardless of the use, if a
water caution use area has been established pursuant to Section 51-3-11 of the
Mississippi Code. Id A water use caution area gives the Permit Board even greater
regulatory power over rivers and streams but can only be implemented in times of
drought. See id § 51-3-11.
75. Beneficial use is broadly defined as "a useful purpose as determined by the
Commission, but excluding waste of water.' Id § 51-3-3(e).
76. Id § 51-3-7(2).
77. Id § 51-3-3(i).
78. Id (emphasis added).
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waste capacity, recreation, navigation, fish and wildlife resources and
other ecologic values, estuarine resources, aquifer recharge and
aesthetics."79
As the CEQ has not determined and established a minimum flow
beyond that set by the legislature, current policy relies upon the 7Q,0
minimum flow as the "established minimum flow."8  Therefore, the
Permit Board may grant permit applications for water withdrawals that
would maintain flow above this low threshold." In addition, the Permit
Board can allow water withdrawals that deplete a river or stream below
the established minimum flow in two cases."
First, a municipal user can withdraw water that puts the river under
the established minimum flow "upon written assurance, supported by any
data and reporting requirements that the board deems appropriate that the
water will be immediately returned to the stream in substantially the
same amount to insure the maintenance at all times of the established
minimum flow."83 The Permit Board may deny such a request by a
municipal user to withdraw below the established minimum flow if the
withdrawal would "violate the state's water quality standards ... or
otherwise conflict with the public interest." 4
Second, an industrial user may withdraw water that would put the
river below the established minimum flow "when the water shall be
returned to the stream at a point downstream from the place of
withdrawal, where the board finds that the use will not result in any
79. Id
80. In 1994, the Mississippi legislature amended Miss. CODE. ANN. § 51-3-3 to allow the
CEQ to determine and establish a minimum stream flow different from 7Q,0. See 1994 Miss.
ALS 653. The amendment stated that it would be repealed in five years. Id In 1999, the
legislature acted to delete the repealer date of the 1994 amendment. See 1999 Miss. ALS 386.
Nonetheless, the CEQ has not exercised this authority to date. At least a few regulated riparian
states besides Mississippi adhere to a similarly low historic flow without protection for ecological
values. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6029(1) (West 2008) ("The landowner's right [is
contingent upon] establish[ing] an average minimum flow occurring for 7 consecutive days
within the lowest flow year of record...."); IOWA CODE § 455B.261(15)(a) (West 2008) (defining
"established minimum flow" as minimum flow based upon review of selected historical data).
Other states provide wide discretion to administrative agencies in setting a minimum flow aimed
at protecting human health, welfare and the proverbial "public interest." See, e.g., HAW. REV.
STAT. § 174C-71(1) ("[T]he commission shall... [e]stablish instream flow standards on a stream-
by-stream basis whenever necessary to protect the public interest....").
81. A public hearing must be "accorded any person whose rights may be adversely
affected by such approval." MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-35(1).
82. Id § 51-3-7 (West 2008).
83. Id § 51-3-7(2). "Municipal use" is defined as "the use of water by a municipal
government and the inhabitants thereof, primarily to promote the life, safety, health, comfort and
business pursuits of the inhabitants" and does not encompass the irrigation of crops within the
corporate boundaries. Id § 51-3-3(d).
84. 08-020-001 MIss. CODE R. § 3(B)(1)(a)(ii) (Weil 2008).
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substantial detriment to property owners affected thereby or to the public
interest."8 Industrial users may be required to "conduct such studies or
to provide such information as [the Permit Board] deems necessary to
determine the potential effect of the proposed use on the affected
ecosystem and on the public interest" before withdrawing water below
the established minimum flow.
86
The Permit Board does have the authority to approve an application
for the withdrawal of a lesser amount than requested if "the full amount
requested would interfere with a vested right or is against public
interest."87 It also may grant a permit subject to special conditions, such
as the installation of a device to measure the flow of the river.8 The
Board must reject an application for withdrawal if "the proposed use of
the water sought to be permitted is not for beneficial purposes, is not
consistent with standards established by the commission, or is
detrimental to the public interest." 9 Finally, it must reject any application
for withdrawal that would violate pollution laws or impair navigability."
The Board also issues, reissues, denies, revokes, and modifies water
quality certification applications pursuant to section 401 of the federal
Clean Water Act.9' State certification is required for federal licenses and
permits regarding activities that could result in discharge into the waters
of the United States. 2
85. Miss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-7(2).
86. 08-020-001 MISS. CODER. § 3(B)(l)(b)(ii).
87. MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-35(1).
88. 08-020-001 MISS. CODE R. § 3(J). The Permit Board also has the authority to revoke
a permit if, among other reasons, "the permit holder is using the water resources of the state in a
manner deemed to be contrary to the public interest." Id § 2(H)(3). For general background on
varied applications of the phrase "public interest," see discussion supm note 38.
89. MISS. CODEANN. § 51-3-13.
90. Id § 51-3-7.
91. Id. § 49-17-28.
92. In reviewing 401 certifications, the Permit Board considers, among other factors, the
impact on other uses of the water; the degree of physical, chemical, and biological impact on the
water; the effect on circulation patterns and water movement; and the degree of alteration to the
aquatic ecosystem. See 08-030-007 MIss. CODE R. § 4(A). If one of the following conditions is
present, the Permit Board will not issue a 401 certification, unless it is
assured that appropriate measures will be taken to eliminate unreasonable degradation
and irreparable harm to waters of the State.
1. The proposed activity permanently alters the aquatic ecosystem such that water
quality criteria are violated and/or it no longer supports its existing or classified
uses. An example is the channelization of streams.
3. The proposed activity adversely impacts waters containing State or federally
recognized threatened or endangered species.
20091
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c. Water Management Planning
In accord with Mississippi Code Annotated § 51-3-21, the CEQ is
charged with providing a comprehensive state water management plan
that includes attaining the maximum beneficial use of water, maximizing
economic development, fostering environmental protection,
implementing flood control measures, preventing waste and
unreasonable use, acknowledging existing water rights, preserving water
quality and quantity, and preparing for emergency situations.93 The CEQ
must also "give careful consideration to the requirements of public
recreation and to the protection and procreation of fish and wildlife."94
Although the legislature provided that the state water management
plan was to be completed by 1997,9' the CEQ has not adopted such a plan
to date, due, in part, to a lack of staffing and funding resources." As an
4. The proposed activity adversely impacts a special or unique aquatic habitat, such
as National or State Wild and Scenic Rivers and/or State Outstanding Resource
Waters.
8. The proposed activity results in significant environmental impacts which may
adversely impact water quality.
Id. § 4(B).
In 1994, the United States Supreme Court recognized the broad power of states to consider
"any other appropriate requirement of state law" by allowing the state of Washington to impose a
minimum stream flow requirement upon a 401 certification issued to a municipality constructing
a hydroelectric power plant. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511
U.S. 700, 708 (1994). 401 certification is not of broad usage in that it is rarely applicable beyond
activities requiring federal National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits, wetlands
dredge and fill permits, hydroelectric licenses, and licenses for nuclear power plants. MARC R.
POIRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 18.12 (2008). Nevertheless, the state likely
can condition these certifications with any limitations necessary to ensure compliance with the
state's minimum flow requirements. The MDEQ, through the Permit Board and the Office of
Land and Water Resources respectively, also may be able to offer limited instream flow protection
through the regulation of underground injection controls and dams. See 08-030-007 MISS. CODE
R. (concerning National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits and Underground
Injection Control permits) and 08-020-003 MISS. CODE R. § 5 ("The Commission may prescribe
minimum flow releases from any dam or reservoir, as necessary, to protect downstream uses or
otherwise prudently manage available surface water .... Any dam that impounds a watercourse
with a continuous flow shall be designed so that the established minimum flow for the stream (as
established by the Commission) is maintained.").
93. MIss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-21(2).
94. Id. § 51-3-21(6).
95. Id. § 51-3-8(1). For a detailed discussion of the limited statewide water management
planning in Mississippi, see McLaughlin, supra note 45, at 716-20.
96. Mississippi Commission on Environmental Quality, Official Minutes (May 25, 2006),
http://www.deq.state.ms.us/MDEQ.nsf/pdf/AboutMAY2006OFFICIALMINUTESMISSCOM
MISSENVQUL/$File/May0/o202006%20minutes.pdf?OpenElement (commenting on funding
and staff shortages). Recommendations by the Mississippi Water Resources Management
Planning Council (entitled A Water Management Plan for the State of Mississipp) were
presented to the legislature in 1995, yet have not been acted upon in formulating an official state
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alternative, the state statute requires the CEQ to analyze piecemeal any
proposed water management plans submitted by local joint management
districts under existing state water policy, though most of these joint
management districts are primarily engaged in flood and erosion control
projects, as opposed to conservation measures.97 One scholar posited,
"[W]ithout real planning, one is hard put to justify any claim that
regulated riparian statutes promise rational management in place of the
haphazard controls that preceded the introduction of regulated
riparianism. '98
water management plan. MIss. WATER RES. MGMT. PLANNING COUNCIL, A WATER MANAGEMENT
PLAN FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI (June 20, 1995) (on file with author). Other states report
difficulties with inadequate staff to monitor public trust resources. For example, in 2001, the
Chairperson of the Hawai'i Board of Land and Natural Resources and Hawai'i Commission on
Water Resource Management stressed the need for state agencies to have additional resources in
order to fulfill their trust responsibilities. See Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing
Hawai'i's Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 16, at 44-45 (statement of Gilbert Coloma-Agaran).
But see id at 54-55 (statement of Hawai'i State Senator Colleen Hanabusa) (suggesting it
unlikely that legislature would appropriate additional funding for trust resource protection).
97. MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-8-31 (o); McLaughlin, supra note 45, at 716-18. A local joint
water management district is created by two or more counties or municipalities for the purpose of
"establishing a water supply system, conserving water resources, developing additional water
resources or any other water or wastewater management function not being performed by an
existing water management district." MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 51-8-1, -3. The Yazoo Mississippi
Delta Joint Water Management District is apparently the only district in the state promoting
conservation practices. See Yazoo Mississippi Delta Joint Water Management District Water
Management Plan (Jan. 18, 2006), http://www.ymd.org/about.htm. The state legislature has also
provided for the creation of local drainage districts for the purpose of "reclaiming wet, swamp, or
overflowed lands for agricultural and sanitary purposes conducive to public health." MISS. CODE
ANN. § 51-31-5. The board of commissioners (either local or county) has the power to "take
necessary measures for prevention of erosion, floodwater, and sediment damage; to further the
conservation, development, utilization, and disposal of water." Id § 51-33-3. Further, "master
water management districts," consisting of two or more existing drainage or water management
districts, may be created for the limited purposes of carrying out improvements with respect to
"drainage, prevention of floodwater damage, or the conservation, development, utilization, and
disposal of water, including the impoundment, diversion, flowage, and distribution of waters for
recreation, beautification, welfare, and other beneficial use" in cooperation with the U.S.
Secretary of Agriculture or another federal agency. Id § 51-7-1.
98. Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 9.05(b); see aso, e.g., Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897,
900-01 (N.Y. 1968) ("[T]he comprehensive plan is the essence of zoning."); Jeremy Nathan
Jungreis, 'ennit"Me Another Drink: A Proposal for Safeguarding the Water Riaghts of Federal
Lands in the Regulated Riparian East 29 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 410 (2005) ("Before a state
can effectively develop a long term plan for a water resource, it must first determine how much
water is available, what percentage is being used, and the manner of use."); Olivia S. Choe,
Appurtenancy Reconceptuaized" Managing Water in an Era of Scarity, 113 YALE L.J. 1909,
1939 (2004) (arguing that without proper long-term planning "regulated riparianism will fare no
better at conserving water supply than its common law predecessor"); Charles M. Haar, In
Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARW. L. REv. 1154, 1154-56 (1955).
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III. CURRENT USE OF THE 7Q,0 1METHOD FOR PRESERVING INSTREAM
FLOWS
Since the adoption of a regulated riparian system, the minimum
flow required for Mississippi's rivers and streams has been calculated
using the 7Q,0 formula.99 As described briefly above, 7Q,0 only preserves
the level of flow one could expect during the lowest-flowing seven
consecutive days, conceivably akin to a week-long drought, that occurs
on average once every ten years.'" 7Q,0 is recommended by the EPA for
calculating water quality, and is currently used as the standard for
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits under the
federal Clean Water Act.'"' in Mississippi, 7Q, arose out of water quality
planning and pollution abatement programs. It was established as the
design criterion for pollution treatment plants to assure the effluent
returning to the stream would be of acceptable quality. 2
In this Part, Subpart A addresses the value of maintaining relatively
natural flows, while Subpart B outlines the principles behind productive
instream flow protections beyond those recommended solely for water
quality purposes. Subpart C summarizes several of the myriads of
scientific studies documenting the failures of 7Q,0 in preserving aquatic
habitat, and Subpart D surveys several alternative legislative and
regulatory mandates in place in other states that offer greater fish and
wildlife protections than Mississippi's current policy Finally, Subpart E
examines the current stresses on Mississippi's waterways.
Together, these Subparts lay the foundation for the major contention
of this Article, as set forth in Parts IV through VI: the public trust
doctrine, following a model derived from the Hawai'i Supreme Court's
recent Wai'ahole I decision, may have untapped potential as an
independent source for preserving instream flows in Mississippi-and
conceivably other regulated riparian states-which could avoid
ecological degradation in the face of anticipated water shortages, though
not without considerable constitutional challenges.
99. MIss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-3 (West 2007).
100. Id.
101. See Clean Water Act §303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2000); Protection of
Environment, 40 C.ER. § 130-31 (2003); WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK: SECOND
EDITION, EPA-823B-94-005a (Aug. 1994). See genemlly Jeffrey M. Gaba, New Sources, New
Growth and the Clean WaterAct, 55 ALA. L. REv. 651 (2004).
102. See Ron Garavelli, Chief of Fisheries, Miss. Dep't of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks,
Presentation on Minimum Flows and Fishery Resources to the Environmental Protection Council
Advisory Committee (Oct. 28, 1993) (on file with author).
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A. Importance ofMaintaining a Relatively Natural Flow
The importance of maintaining a natural flow regime has been
confirmed by scientific research since at least the early 1990s.' °3 A
natural flow regime consists of periodic flooding and the regular
occurrence of high and low flows, which trigger physiological and
behavioral responses of aquatic and terrestrial species that are intimately
linked to these physical changes in water level. Each type of flow
provides different benefits to the river's overall health.'"
Flooding sequences signal opportunities for fish to migrate
upstream or laterally into floodplain habitat for reproductive purposes,
flush deposition of fine sediment through larger-grained gravels and
cobbles that provide critical substrate for fish spawning, oxygenate the
habitat for egg development, and supply organic material to the
watershed that forms important building blocks to aquatic and terrestrial
food webs.' °5 Regularly occurring high flows determine the physical
shape of the river, as well as its pools and riffles, and ventilate fish eggs
that have been deposited in spawning gravels.' 6 Low, but not stagnant,
flows shape the amount of available habitat, maintain water temperature
and water quality, and allow fish to move to feeding and spawning
areas. 107
Environmental problems arise when the natural flow regime is not
considered.' An absence of flooding or high water levels leads to
conditions in which fish can no longer access upstream, side channel, or
floodplain areas for particular life history requirements like reproduction,
development of juvenile stages, or other migratory behavior patterns.' 9
Further, as a result of theabsence of high waters, riparian plants encroach
into the river, interstitial riverbed habitats are covered with
sedimentation, and a wide variety of bird species that capitalize on use of
the diverse flora of riparian canopies are no longer able to flourish in the
area once the diversity of plant species are simplified. 0
103. Carl Vinson Inst. of Gov't, supra note 6, at 30.
104. See SANDRA POSTEL & BRIAN RICHTER, RIVERS FOR LIFE: MANAGING WATER FOR
PEOPLE AND NATURE 20 (2003).
105. Id; E-mail from Thomas Kennedy, The Nature Conservancy, to author (Dec. 18,
2008) (on file with author).
106. See POSTEL & RICHTER, supra note 104, at 20.
107. Id.
108. Harold M. Tyus, Effects ofAltered Stream Flows on Fishery Resources, 15 FISHERIES
18, 18-20 (1990).
109. See id
110. Id; see also E-mail from Thomas Kennedy, supra note 105; Tyus, supra note 108, at
18-20.
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B. Principles of Instream Flow Protection
Researchers at the University of Georgia's Carl Vinson Institute of
Government have identified seven principles of instream flow protection
that go well beyond the basic water quality standard of mitigating the
impact of pollution discharge into streams and rivers."' These principles
are intended to:
1. Preserve whole functioning ecosystems rather than focus on single
species.
2. Mimic, to the greatest extent possible, the natural flow regime,
including seasonal and inter-annual variability.
3. Expand the spatial scope of instream flow studies beyond the river
channel to include the riparian corridor and floodplain systems.
4. Conduct studies using an interdisciplinary approach.
5. Use reconnaissance information to guide choices from among a
variety of tools and approaches for technical evaluations in particular
river systems.
6. Practice adaptive management, an approach for recommending
adjustments to operational plans in the event that objectives are not
being achieved.
7. Involve stakeholders in the process."2
7Q10 deviates markedly from these principles by considering one and
only one factor-water quality. A river's overallhealth, however, depends
on a wide variety of factors, of which water quality is but one. While
7Q,0 preserves a flow only expected during, in effect, a week-long
drought that occurs once in every ten-year period, it is applied year-round
to valuable instream resources that serve as important fish and wildlife
habitats, without consideration or adjustment for seasonal variations. '
In Mississippi, high flows occur regularly in February and March."4
Flows begin decreasing in April and May, reaching a low-flow season
111. Seerley, supmnote 5, at 31.
112. Id (citing NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., THE SCIENCE OF
INSTREAM FLOWS: A REVIEW OF THE TEXAS INSTREAM FLOW PROGRAM (2005)).
113. For a graph depicting these varied flow periods, see POSTEL & RICHTER, supra note
104, at 105. See also Stephen E. Draper, Sharing Water Through Interbasin Transfer and Basin of
Orgin Pmtection in, Georgia: Issues for Evaluation in Comprehensive State Water Planning for
Georgia Surface Water Rivers and Groundwater Aquifers; 21 GA. ST. U. L. Rav. 339, 370 n.143
(2004); Joseph F. McLean, Stramflow Policy in Vermont Managing Conflicting Demands on
the State Waters 19 VT. L. REv. 191, 223 n.217 (1994). Minimum flows such as 7Q, tend to
become the objective (or target), flow, rather than a true limitation. Garavelli, supra note 102.
When this occurs, "the fishery is eventually reduced to the worst case or drought condition in
perpetuity." Clair B. Stalnaker, Low Flow as a Limting Factor in Warmwater Streams; in
WARMWATER STREAMS SYMPOSIUM 193 (L. Krumholz ed., 1981).
114. See generally United States Geological Survey, http://ms.water.usgs.gov (last visited
Jan. 23, 2009).
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from June through September."' Beginning in October, flows increase
until the commencement of the high flow season in February. ' Despite
these fluctuations in natural flow, the required 7Q0 flow remains the
same year-round."' One group of authors asserted, "The 7Q,0 should
never be used to make instream flow prescriptions for riverine
stewardship.... Making such a low flow the norm [for water quantity
purposes] is like recommending the sickest day of your life as a
satisfactory level for future well-being."'"
Further, the Instream Flow Council stated that as "a minimum flow
standard to sustain aquatic life, 7Q,0 lacks any scientific or common
sense foundation and can be expected to result in severe degradation of
riverine biota and processes.""' Although the 7Q 0 method may protect
water quality in many instances, it fails to consider the natural flow of
rivers necessary for the consistent survival-level protection of fish and
wildlife.' 0 One natural resource manager described the 7Q, method as
"statistically based with no consideration of chemical, biological or
environmental-ecosystem considerations.' 2 '
-C Documented Failures of 7Q o in Protecting Instream Flows
Aquatic biologists have come to a clear consensus that more water
needs to be reserved for instream habitat than is provided under the 7Q 0
method.'22 An extensive field study by prominent expert Donald Leroy
Tennant found that 10% mean annual flow (MAF) was the minimum
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. ANNEARETAL., supranote 10, at 179-79.
119. Id. at 131.
120. GA. DEP'T OF NATURAL REs., supra note 10 ("DNR's 7Q0 rule ... is not based on the
science of how much water should remain in a stream to maintain a healthy aquatic
community."); see also Clair B. Stalnaker, LowFlowas a Lm'ting Factor in Warmwater Streans
WARMWATER STREAMS SYMPOsIuM, supra note 113, at 194 ("If we must think in terms of
minimums, let it be minimum regimes and not single minimum discharges.").
121. Miss. WATER RES. PLANNING CouNcIL, Official Minutes (Sept. 21, 1993)
(unpublished transcript on file with author); see also, e.g., Bradford Bowman, Instram Flow
Regulation: Plugging the Holes in Mainek Water Law, 54 ME. L. REv. 287, 307 (2002)
(explaining that the then-informal policy allowing streams to subside to 7Q0 in Maine "show[ed]
no consideration for either the natural hydrograph or the seasonal needs of the riverine
ecosystem"); sources cited infia note 136.
122. EVANS & ENGLAND, supra note 8, at 3 (citing Tennant, supra note 8, at 359-73;
Stalnaker, supra note 8, at 321-37; Wesche & Rechard, supra note 8, at 1-121; Estes & Orsbom,
supra note 10, at 389-98; Bulak & Jobsis, supra note 10, at 1-51; Orth & Leonard, supra note 10,
at 129-38.
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flow required for "short-term survival habitat of most aquatic life." '23
Tennant described the conditions exhibited at 10% MAF:
1. Short-term survival of most aquatic life.
2. Fifty percent or more of the stream bottom is likely to be
dewatered.
3. Side channels (important for early- life stages of many fish
species) are likely to be severely or totally dewatered.
4. Riparian vegetation may suffer.
5. Stream bank cover will be severely diminished.
6. Fish will have difficulty migrating upstream over and through
riffle areas.
7. Fish are crowded into pools and vulnerable to over-harvest.
8. Water temperature may become too high for some fish
species.'24
A later study, considering river hydraulic geometry characteristics,
concluded, "[R]iver width, depth, and velocity rapidly decrease toward
zero at flows below 10% MAF, thus severely limiting or eliminating fish
habitat. ',2 5 These types of studies indicate that a river flowing under 10%
MAF is unhealthy, offering insufficient living conditions to fish and
wildlife. Tellingly, in Tennant's study, streams with only 10% MAF still
exceeded the 7Q,0 flow more than three-fourths of the time.2 6
D State Depatures from 7Qo
Calculating 7Q,0 is a process that can be performed through data
analysis in front of a computer screen, as opposed to requiring extensive
fieldwork, making it inexpensive and easily applicable on a statewide
basis.2 7 However, the insufficiency of this minimum flow in protecting
aquatic habitat, as documented above, necessitates a review of alternative
methods for managing instream flows in Mississippi. Several alternative
methods utilized in other states offer greater fish and wildlife protection
123. SeeTennant, supr note 9, at 6, 9.
124. ANNEAR, ETAL., supm note 10, at 178 (citing Tennant, supra note 9, at 6-10; Tennant,
supra note 8, at 359-73); EVANS & ENGLAND, supia note 8, at 359-73 (citing Tennant, supra note
8, at 359-73).
125. Daniel Caissie et al., Comparison of Hydrologically Based Insueam Flow Methods
Using a Resampling Technique, 34 CANADIAN J. OF Cfv. ENG'G 66, 72-73 (2007) (citing Daniel
Caissie & Nassir El-Jabi, Instream Flow Assessment: From Holistic Approaches to Habitat
Modeling, 28 CANADIAN WATER RES. J. 173-83 (2003)); see also Daniel Caissie & Nassir EI-Jabi,
Comparison and Regionalization of Hydrologically Based Instream Flow'Techniques in Atlantic
Canada, 22 CANADIAN J. OF Ctv. ENG'G 235,235-46 (1995).
126. SeeTennant, supra note 9, at 6-10; EVANS & ENGLAND, supra note 8, at 359-73.
127. See, e.g.,Tennant, supia note 9, at 7.
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while retaining affordability, speed of computation, and wide applica-
bility.'
28
Many of these other states rely upon the "Tennant Method," which
protects a percentage of the river's MAF based on seasonal fluctuations
and allows streams to remain connected with their floodplains.' 29 As the
MAF can be calculated easily with adequate records and accurately
applied with limited field work, the Tennant Method is desirable for its
efficiency and has been adopted in some form in several jurisdictions.'30
For example, after recognizing the deficiencies associated with the
7Q, method, which the state of Georgia originally adopted for
calculating minimum flows in 1977, Georgia adopted an interim
modified Tennant Method in 2001."3' Similarly, Arkansas subscribes to a
128. See, e.g., id
129. See id. The Tennant Method and its prodigy reflect the natural flow regime by
making serial adjustments across seasons and protect aquatic habitat by keeping the flow above
10% MAE Id. at 8. States can choose the level of protection they wish to pursue and draft a
minimum flow percentage requirement based thereon. Specific rivers may garner greater
protection due to special qualities such as endangered species, natural beauty, or need for
restoration. For a further discussion of Tennant's description of the aquatic conditions at 10%
MAF, see supra note 123 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., EVANS & ENGLAND, supra note 8, at 21.
131. Id. A 1995 study performed by Georgia's Wildlife Resources Division, a division of
the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) organized under the Environmental Protection
Division (EPD), recommended several methods to protect instream flow that would supplant
7Q,0, including a flow rate of 30% of the MAF for unregulated streams, a seasonal tiered
approach calling for higher percentages for dammed streams, and special protections for trout
streams. GA. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., supra note 10, at 24-26. The recommendations were made
as an interim measure before further testing could be performed, and the study noted that said
recommendations would only provide some protection, not enhance, fish habitat. Id. at 27.
Unfortunately, Georgia did not enact all of the recommendations from the 1995 Wildlife
Resources Division report. Id. at 29-30. In fact, the report specifically did not recommend
monthly 7Q0, which Georgia ultimately adopted as part of its new state policy. Id at 28. Still,
Georgia's current approach preserves flows by seasonal variation, unlike the 7Q,0 method. Id. at
27. Applicants seeking water withdrawal permits in Georgia are allowed to choose from three
options:
1. For water supply reservoirs, permittees are required to release from the reservoir the
lesser of the monthly 7Q,0 (thus more seasonally specific than 7Q0) or the inflow to
the reservoir. For direct withdrawals from streams, permittees must allow the lesser
of the monthly 7Q,0 or the inflow to pass the withdrawal point.
2. Applicants can choose to perform a DNR-approved site-specific instream flow study
to determine what minimum flows must be maintained to protect aquatic habitat of
that specific locale. DNR then evaluates the study results and, with the EPD Director,
either concurs or recommends an acceptable minimum flow.
3. Applicants can also choose MAF options:
a. For direct withdrawals from an unregulated stream, the applicant must allow the
lesser of 30% of the MAF or the inflow to pass the stream withdrawal point
(thus, if the inflow is less than 30% of the MAF, the permittee cannot withdraw
water).
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stream flow protection plan that identifies seasonal percentages, though
they are based on monthly mean flows, as opposed to annual mean
flows.
132
There also exist a wide variety of field methods requiring site-
specific measurements that are predictably more accurate than the
"office" methods most often utilized in Georgia and Arkansas. 33 Florida,
for example, employs a progressive program in which five distinct
regional water management districts establish their own minimum flow
levels by site-specific study, taking into account not only water quality,
but also nonconsumptive uses, including fish passage, recreational
activities, and scenic attributes.3 1 If a Floridian waterway falls below or
is projected to fall below the minimum flow requirements, a recovery or
prevention strategy must be implemented.'35 At least for certain waters
that include exceptional resources, wild trout, or threatened or
endangered species, North Carolina also requires on-site evaluation for
determining minimum flows.'
31
b. For regulated water supply reservoirs, the applicant is required to release from
the reservoir the lesser of: 30% of the MAF or inflow from July to November
(low flow season), 60% of the MAF or instream flow from January through
April (high flow season), and 40% of the MAF or inflow from May-June and
December (intermediate flow seasons).
Georgia's policy exempts a wide variety of water users, including agricultural users; those users
already holding, or in the applications pipeline for, water use permits; users of highly "regulated"
waters, such as the Savannah River; and federal dams. See id.
132. See 014-04-002 ARK, CODE R. §§ 2.404-.405 (Weil 2008). This Arkansas regulation
divides the year into three distinct components, based upon the biological process. EVANS &
ENGLAND, supra note 8, at 9-10. From November through March, the recommended minimum
flow is 60% of the mean monthly flow to flush sediments and waste, as well as recharge the
system's fertility through infusing the waterway with nutrients. Id. From April through June, the
recommended minimum flow is 70% of the mean monthly flow to prevent the stranding of eggs
and provide adequate oxygenation for life development. Id From July through October, the
recommended minimum flow is 50% of the mean monthly flow to reserve adequate waste
capacity and prevent overcrowding of fish populations. Id
133. See, e.g., FLA.ADMIN.CODEANN. r. 62-40.473(l)(2008).
134. Id.
135. SeeFLA. STAT. § 373.0421(2) (2008).
136. See 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 02K.0501 (2008). Unfortunately, the implementation of
field methods is often limited in many states by available personnel hours and the expensive
nature of such testing. Mandating circumstances that initiate the requirement of implementing
on-site testing provides more accurate instream protections than the "office" methods described
supra text accompanying note 133, albeit at a significant cost. If Mississippi chooses, or is
forced, to act to provide greater protections to instream flows, the particular method she selects
certainly will raise a host of additional practical and legal ramifications for natural resource
managers. These could include, for example, amending regulations, formulating or reformulating
statewide and regional water plans, and balancing ecological trust uses with other trust and
economic uses. In 2007, in an attempt to address some of these challenges, the Texas legislature
adopted a comprehensive innovative system in which basin-wide citizen councils advised by a
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E. Contemporary Stresses on Sufface Waters
Approximately 20% of the world's 10,000 known freshwater fish
species are now endangered, threatened, or already extinct.' The Nature
Conservancy estimates that 12% of all animals known to science live in
freshwater habitats, and many more depend on such habitats in some way
for survival. 3'
Reduced instream flows have had a devastating effect on fish across
North America.'39 At least forty freshwater fish species in North America
have recently become extinct due to man-induced alterations of physical
habitat.' "° A 1990 study classified 28% of North America's native fish
species as rare or extinct."' The American Fisheries Society reported an
increase of 45% in the number of North American freshwater fish
species considered endangered, threatened, or of special concern.' 2 The
primary cause of this increase was alteration of natural stream flows.' 3
Historically, Mississippi has relied more on groundwater resources
than on surface water.1" Due to a relatively sizeable supply of
groundwater and rainfall, Mississippi has not experienced the severe
statewide droughts and ensuing water shortages that many of the other
southern states, including Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, have endured
in the past decade. '4  Still, for example, 90% of the water needs of the
state capital of Jackson, Mississippi's most populated metropolitan area,
are met by diverted surface flows from the Pearl River and the Ross
Barnett Reservoir,' and surrounding areas are interested in developing a
surface-water supply from these same sources.'47 Mississippi must move
scientific committee determine use priorities on rivers. See 2007 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4596
(West); 2007 Tex. Sess. Law Serv, 5832 (West).
137. See The Nature Conservancy, supra note 12; POSTEL & RICHTER, supm note 104, at
27.
138. POSTEL & RICHTER, supm note 104, at 27.
139. EVANS & ENGLAND, supranote 8, at 2.
140. Id.
141. Id
142. Id.
143. Id
144. As of 1995, groundwater accounted for 73% of the total freshwater withdrawals and
supplied the needs of 90% of the state's population. See MIss. WATER RES. MOMT. PLANNING
COUNCIL, A WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 10, 12 (June 30, 1995) (on
file with author). Mississippi's surface water resources include 84,000 miles of streams and
rivers, including six major rivers: Tombigbee, Pascagoula, Pearl, Big Black, Yazoo, and
Mississippi. Id
145. Id.
146. MISS. WATER RES. MO rT. PLANNING COUNCIL, supra note 144, at 10, 12.
147. See PEARL RIVER BASIN TEAM, MDEQ, PEARL RIVER BASIN STATUS REPORT 2000, at
6, 24 (2000) (on file with author).
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proactively to conserve and protect her healthy yet depletable natural
surface water resources.
Water usage in Mississippi has increased in recent decades and
exceeded the national average for growth from 1950-1980 and 1985-
1990.148 This is due in large part to increased rice farming, catfish
production, and thermoelectric power plants, along with steady
population growth.19 In fact, localized drought conditions in the western
portion of the state between the Yazoo and Mississippi Rivers (known as
the Mississippi Delta), coupled with increased water withdrawals, have
caused the base flows of most streams in the area to decrease.
5 0
Since groundwater no longer recharges streams in the Delta, the
MDEQ has been unable even to calculate 7Q,0 beyond zero for a Delta
stream since 1975."' These extremely low flows directly impact fish and
wildlife habitat, while also threatening the use of the streams as a reliable
source for agricultural irrigation. 2
As these stresses increase statewide, it is only a matter of time
before Mississippi's opportunity to adopt a proactive instream protection
approach turns into a reactive necessity. The remainder of this Article
suggests that Mississippi's broad public trust doctrine, albeit in the face
of considerable constitutional challenges, may operate as a source
independent of the state's water code for demanding state action to
protect instream flows under a framework derived from Hawai'i's
Wai'ahole Idecision.
IV THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine is an ancient legal principle that protects
certain natural resources for the general public.153 The law in most
nations recognizes some form of the public trust doctrine:
148. See MIss. WATER RES. MGMT. PLANNING COUNCIL, supra note 144, at 10-11.
149. Id. at 11. Mississippi's population increased by 706,517 from 1960 to 2000,
representing a 32.44% increase. If Mississippi's population increases at the same rate as it did
from 1990 to 2000, the 2010 population will be 3,144,769. For census data, see CensusScope,
http://www.censusscope.org (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
150. MiSS. WATER REs. MGMT. PLANNING COUNCIL, supra note 144, at 67.
151. Letter from Dennis Riecke, Dep't of Wildlife, Fisheries & Parks, to Lloyd Long,
Miss. Dep't of Envtl. Quality (Aug. 14,2003) (on file with author).
152. MIss. WATER REs. MGMT. PLANNING COUNCIL, supra note 144, at 20.
153. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-18 (1894) (recounting Roman and English
origins of public trust); Sax, supra note 13, at 475; Carol M. Rose, The Comedy ofthe Commons:
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711,727-30 (1986); Carol
M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust 25 ECOL. L.Q. 351, 351-52 (1998);
Timothy M. Mulvaney & Brian Weeks, "Waterlocked" Public Access to NewJersey's Coastline,
34 ECOL. L.Q. 579, 582 (2007); COASTAL STATES ORG., INC., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINETo WORK 1 (David Slade ed., 2d ed. 1997).
INSTREAMFLOWS AND PUBLIC TRUST
Historically, no developed western civilization has recognized absolute
rights of private ownership... [of land between high and low water marks]
as a means of allocating this scarce and precious resource among the
competing public demands. Though private ownership was permitted in the
Dark Ages, neither Roman law nor the English common law as it
developed after the signing of the Magna Charta would permit it.'"
Among the rights of the people recognized by Roman and English law
were the rights of commercial navigation and fisheries.'55 Today, the
public trust doctrine has evolved to protect a greater variety of resources
and uses thereof.'
In this Part, Subpart A first summarizes the genesis of the public
trust doctrine in America and then addresses the evolution of the doctrine
in Mississippi. Subpart B surveys the current protected trust resources in
Mississippi and envisions an extension of the doctrine to additional
natural resources in the future.
A. Origins of the Public Trust
The modem concept that certain lands and waters should be held in
trust for the public to access for fishing, navigational, and commercial
purposes has its roots in the Roman Empire.'" The Institutes of
Justinian, codified in 535 C.E., states:
By the law of nature these things are common to mankind-the air,
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. No one,
therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he respects
habitations, monuments, and buildings, which are not, like the sea, subject
only to the law of nations. 8
After the fall of Rome, feudal law reigned throughout Europe.'59 In
England, the Crown claimed ownership of the rivers and their shores,
along with the authority to transfer such lands into the hands of private
individuals for their exclusive possession and use.'" English kings
commonly issued writs barring fishing and fowling on rivers. 6 ' River
154. United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land Situated in Boston, 523 F Supp. 120, 123 (D.
Mass. 1981).
155. COASTAL STATES ORG., INC., supra note 153, at 170.
156. Id. at 173.
157. SeeTennant, supra note 9, at 6.
158. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 90 n. 1 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 7th ed. 1905).
159. See generally Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An
HistoricalAnalysis, I SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976).
160. Id.
161. M. HALE, DE JURE MARIS ET BRACt-ORUM EJuSDEM, reprinted in S. MOORE, A
HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE ANDTHE LAW RELATING THERETO 373 (1888).
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navigation, however, was essential to the continued success of the
growing merchant class, and private ownership of rivers interfered with
the transport of goods and services.162
In 1215, King John of England signed the Magna Carta. 6' One of
the Magna Carta's provisions required the removal of "all fish-weirs"
from rivers throughout England, except those along the North Sea coast,
thereby limiting the King's ability to convey property rights to waterways
subject to the public trust.' Certain rights remained the permanent
property of the realm and were held by the Crown in its regal capacity in
trust for all subjects.'
The rights retained by the Crown included those of navigation and
fishery in the sea and other tidal waterways, construed by English courts
to include the rights to beach vessels and unload cargo on the water's
banks, dry and haul fishing nets on the upland areas, and deliver fish to
the nearest market.6' Although the banks of rivers were considered the
private property of the riparian owners, they were impressed with certain
public trust rights, as the sea's shore was "the property of no man."'6 7
The King had no power to convey those rights and any attempt to do
so would have been an invalid usurpation of the rights of a free people
and their Parliament.' Accordingly, when the King conveyed private
ownership of the land encompassing the thirteen original colonies, he did
162. Id
163, MAGNACARTA § 23 (1215).
164. Id
165. See, e.g., Mulvaney & Weeks, supmnote 153, at 582-84.
166. See Stevens v. Paterson & Newark R.R. Co., 34 N.J.L. 532, 539 (N.J. 1870)
(explaining traditional understanding of public use of shoreline). An 1830 treatise states:
So the shore lies between the fishery or navigation and the public, but the public have a
right to the fishery and navigation, and a convenient way is presumed over the shore for
carrying them on; such as for launching boats, carriage and footway for the conveyance
of the fish, goods, to and from the boats, and for exercising whatever other
conveniences common sense and usage point out as essential to these rights; in short,
whatever obstruction would render the fishery or navigation nugatory, must be deemed
unlawful and incompatible with those rights.
R. HALL, THE RIGHTS OF THE CROWN AND THE PRIVILEGES OF THE SUBJECT IN THE SEA-SHORES OF
THE REALM (R.L. Loveland ed., 3d ed. 1875), xprinted hi STUART ARCHIBALD MOORE, HISTORY
OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 665, 847-48 (London, Stevens & Haynes,
3d ed. 1888).
167. ARTHUR JOSEPH HUNT, THE LAW OF BOUNDARIES AND FENCES 8 (Henry Stephen ed.,
Butterworth & Co. 1904) (1896). Today, there are considerable differences amongst jurisdictions
as to the public rights and uses that remain after a legislatively approved conveyance of trust lands
to private ownership. See generally PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE To WORK, supra note
153, at 237-38.
168. SeeMartin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 411 (1842).
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not convey those inalienable rights.'69 The American Revolution resulted
in the conveyance of these royal rights to the legislatures of each of the
colonies, to be held in trust for their people.' 0
In accordance with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, all new states
were subsequently admitted on equal footing with the original states,
with the same rights in the tidewaters and the lands under them.'7' In
1817, the United States Congress admitted Mississippi into the Union,'72
and, at least since 1821, the United States' judiciary has recognized these
public rights in tidewaters and the lands under them under the public trust
doctrine.' 3 Today, the nature of the protected resources and the scope of
the associated public rights are defined by, and subject to, the property
laws of each state.'"
B. Protected Trust Resources
Mississippi's Supreme Court first acknowledged the state's public
trust doctrine in 1933, holding that the title of the state is held for the
chief purposes of commerce and navigation.' Since that time,
Mississippi courts have addressed tidal and navigable waters well beyond
the confines of the original 1800's interpretations of the trust in America,
as set forth in Subpart 1 below. Subpart 2 explains how Mississippi has
expanded public trust protections to a variety of natural resources beyond
these traditionally protected waterways.' 6
1. Tidal and Navigable Waterways
In broad terms, the state owns the tidelands, which are impressed
with a public trust for the benefit of all."' Public ownership in tidal
waterways and the lands beneath the water generally extends up to the
169. Id. at 412; Bell v. Gough, 23 N.J.L. 624, 684 (1852); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 11-
13 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1821) (summarizing original conveyance of East and West Jersey, later to
become known as "New Jersey").
170. Marttn, 41 U.S. at 410; see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 36 (1894).
171. Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, § 14, art. V, 1 Stat. 50;
see alsoPollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 222 (1845); Shively, 152 U.S. at 57.
172. 3 Stat. 472, 473 (1817).
173. See Arnolg 6 N.J.L. at 3; Martin, 41 U.S. at 411-12; Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387,435 (1892).
174. E.g., Sands v. Mahistee River Imp. Co., 123 U.S. 288,295 (1887).
175. SeeRouse v. Saucier's Heirs, 146 So. 291,291-92 (Miss. 1933).
176. Cf Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparave Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctines:
Classifications of States, PopertyfRihts, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 24
(2007) ("Alabama has a poorly developed public trust doctrine that has never been expanded
beyond the basic federal doctrine.").
177. Shively, 152U.S. at 9.
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mean high or low water lines.'78 Mississippi is a high-water state. 9 In
Phillips Petroleum Co. v Mssissipp; '° the United States Supreme Court
clarified that the state maintains trust ownership over all lands beneath
waters subject to the tide's influence.'8'
In addition to those waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide,
what other lands and waters are subject to the public trust? Under the
English common law, "navigable waters" were subject to the trust, and
"navigable waters" and "tidal waters" were synonymous because no
rivers in England were significant enough to be navigable if not flowed
by the tide.' 2 After some initial dispute in light of the numerous
navigable, nontidal waters in the Americas, the public trust doctrine in
the United States generally has protected, at a minimum, the public's
178. Several states, including Delaware, Maine, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, are "low
water" states, with public ownership of the submerged lands lying seaward of the mean low water
line. See State ex rel. Buckson v. Pa. R.R. Co., 228 A.2d 587, 597 (Del. 1967) (stating that the
riparian proprietor owns to low water mark); Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 176 (Me.
1989); Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. 21, 30 (1869) (holding that riparian title extends to
low-water mark, though allowing for public passage during high tides); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-81
(2008); see also Jose L. Fernandez, Untwisting the Common Law: Public Trust and the
Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance, 62 ALB. L. REv. 623, 628, 630 (1998) (addressing
Massachusetts colonial ordinance apparently extending private property seaward to mean low
water line). Most states are "high water" states that recognize state ownership in tidal waterways,
the underlying submerged lands, and the shore waterward of the mean high water line. See, e.g.,
Fogerty v. State, 231 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986); Wicks v. Howard, 388 A.2d 1250, 1251 (Md.
1978); Cinque Bambini P'ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986); O'Neill v. State Highway
Dep't, 5235 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1967). In some states, notably New Jersey and Oregon, the public also
has rights to some areas above the high water line. See Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 153, at
585 (citing Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984) (relying
upon public trust doctrine to protect rights to dry sand areas)); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462
P2d 671 (Or. 1969) (relying upon customary use to protect rights to dry sand areas). However,
twenty years after Thornton, the Oregon Supreme Court limited the circumstances to which the
doctrine of custom applies to dry sand areas. See McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d 714, 724 (Or.
1989) (finding that doctrine of custom, as it had been applied to beaches along the Oregon coast,
did not apply to a cove that did not abut the ocean where there was no testimony that showed
customary use by ancient inhabitants of the narrow beach on the bank of the cove).
179. See Cinque Bambini P.hi, 491 So. 2d at 516 ("[T]he United States granted to the
State of Mississippi in trust all lands ... including their mineral and other subsurface resources,
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide below the then mean high water level.").
180. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
181. Id. (declaring all tidelands of public trust interest regardless of navigability). The
Phillips decision marked a departure from the high court's recent disapproval of a public trust
claim by the State of California. See Summa Corp. v. California, 466 U.S. 198 (1984) (holding
that even if property was part of tidelands to which California would have acquired a public trust
easement, the State's failure to assert its claim to such servitude during the original treaty and
patent proceedings that ended the war between Mexico and America in 1851 barred California's
claim forever).
182. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336 (1876) ("In England, no waters are deemed
navigable except those in which the tide ebbs and flows."); The Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53
U.S. 443, 455 (1851) ("In England... tide water and navigable water are synonymous terms.").
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interest in the beds of not only tidal waters, but also any navigable waters
since the mid-nineteenth century.1
83
The classification of certain waters as "navigable" remains under
the prerogative of the states and varies widely by context and
jurisdiction.' s" The United States Supreme Court has cautioned, "[A]ny
reliance upon judicial precedent must be predicated upon careful
appraisal of the purpose for which the concept of 'navigability' was
invoked in a particular case."'85 While Mississippi statutes define both
"navigable waters"'' 6 and "public waterways,"'8 7 the determinative factor
for defining "navigable" in Mississippi has been and remains "naviga-
bility in fact."'
Mississippi waters are "navigable-in-fact" when they "are used, or
are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and/or travel are or may be conducted in the
customary modes of trade and travel on water."'89  Further, the
Mississippi Supreme Court has determined that waters are "navigable-in-
183. See Barney, 94 U.S. at 338 (explaining that "all waters are deemed navigable which
are really so," at least for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 437 (1892) (holding that bottomlands of the Great Lakes are subject to same public trust
protections as bottomlands of tidal waters); see also, e.g., Bell v. Gough, 23 N.J.L. 624 (1852);
The Genessee Chief, 53 U.S. at 455; Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971).
184. E.g., Day v. Armstrong, 362 P2d 137, 143 (Wyo. 1961) (citing Connelly v. United
States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913)).
185. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 171 (1979) (emphasis removed); see
also, e.g., Archer v. Greenville Sand & Gravel Co., 233 U.S..60 (1914); John A. Humbach,
Comment, Public Rights in the Navigable Streams of New York, 6 PACE ENVrL. L. REv. 461
(1989). Factors that can influence the meaning of the term "navigable" include the scope of
federal admiralty jurisdiction, the scope of Federal Commerce Clause authority, the application of
the navigational servitude exception to unconstitutional takings or public right of passage claims
under state law, and colonial, state, or federal riparian grants. Although the Army Corps of
Engineers publishes a list of water bodies that are "navigable" or "nonnavigable" for federal
purposes, these declarations "serve only to exempt these bodies of water from the duties and
responsibilities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers" and are not controlling. See Dycus v.
Sillers, 557 So. 2d 486, 501 n.68 (Miss. 1990).
186. MISS. CODE ANN. § 5 1-1-1 (West 2008) (defining "navigable waters" as "all rivers,
creeks and bayous in this state, twenty-five (25) miles in length, that have sufficient depth and
width of water for thirty (30) consecutive days in the year for floating a steamboat with carrying
capacity of two hundred (200) bales of cotton").
187. Id. § 51-1-4 (defining "public waterways" as "[t]hose portions of all natural flowing
streams in this state having a mean annual flow of not less than one hundred (100) cubic feet per
second").
188. See Dycus, 557 So. 2d at 498-99; Culley v. Pearl River Ind. Comm'n, 108 So. 2d 390,
398 (Miss. 1959).
189. Ryals v. Pigott, 580 So. 2d 1140, 1152 (Miss. 1990) (suggesting essential question is
navigability-in-fact of watercourses as of the dawn of Mississippi statehood in 1817); see also
Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1981) ("It is, indeed, the susceptibility to use as highways of
commerce which gives sanction to the public right of control over navigation upon [navigable
waterways]."); PUTrrNG THE PUBLiC TRUST DoCrRt To WORK, supra note 153, at 5.
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fact" when they are navigable by loggers, fishermen, pleasure boaters,
canoers, tubers,'90 and even by a toothpick with a sail. 9' The court has
held that it is enough that some portion of the water body is "navigable-
in-fact" or is influenced by tides for the entire water body to be subject to
the public trust.9'
2. Other Protected Resources
Some jurisdictions have expanded the trust to cover not only tidally
flowed lands and navigable waters, but also additional waterbodies and
expanded uses therein."' In certain states, the public trust doctrine
190. Ryals, 580 So. 2d at 1152 ("[T]he customary mode of travel on the Bogue Chitto
River in southeastern Pike County is through small outboard motor boats, fishing boats, canoes,
tubes and other pleasure craft. The customary mode of commerce and trade is providing facilities
for hire where persons can rent such vessels. Moreover, the Bogue Chitto is surely capable in its
ordinary condition today of supporting commercial fishing. Taking the navigable-in-fact
definition at face value.., the Bogue Chitto River passes the test"); see also Guilliams v. Beaver
Lake Club, 175 P 437, 441 (Or. 1918) (declaring that a "vessel carrying a load of passengers to a
picnic is in law just as much engaged in commerce as the one carrying grain or other
merchandise"); Veazie v. Dwinel, 50 Me. 479, 484 (1862) ("All streams in this State of sufficient
capacity, in their natural condition, to float boats, rafts or logs, are deemed public highways, and
as such, subject to the use of the public.")). But see, e.g., 19 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 65 (1972)
(limiting public navigability to "commercial uses and purposes").
191. SeeCinque Bambini P'ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 515 (Miss. 1986) ("[S]o long as
by unbroken water course-when the level of the waters is at mean high water mark--one may
hoist a sail upon a toothpick and without interruption navigate from the navigable channel/area to
land, always afloat, the waters traversed and the lands beneath them are within the inland
boundaries we consider the United States set for the properties granted the State in trust.").
192. See Dycus, 557 So. 2d 486. A Maryland court set forth an analogous rule, stating,
"Where a stretch of river is navigable lengthwise, ... all of the waters between the opposite
shores or banks are comprehended within the term 'navigable waters."' Wagner v. City of
Baltimore, 124 A.2d 815, 821 (Md. 1956). If this were not the case, the area immediately
adjacefit to the bank (usually only a few feet deep and thus nonnavigable) would not be subject to
the Public Trust Doctrine when it clearly should be. Id. Nonetheless, in analyzing the definition
of "navigability" as it pertains to the federal Clean Water Act, a fractured Supreme Court left no
majority opinion, leaving Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion controlling. Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). Kennedy suggests that, for wetlands to be "navigable," they must
play an important role in, or have a "significant nexus to," the integrity of an aquatic system
comprising navigable waters, as opposed to a simple finding of geographic proximity to the
system. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)). Lower courts continue to struggle in the case-by-
case application of this "significant nexus" test. See, e.g., United States v. Chevron Pipe Line
Co., 437 E Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (suggesting Rapanos provided little guidance to
implement the "vague, subjective centerpiece" significant nexus test).
193. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476-83 (1989)
(recognizing state interest in protecting rights of "bathing, swimming, recreation, fishing and
mineral development"); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P2d 362, 365 (Cal. 1980)
(holding the "permissible range of public uses" far broader than navigation, commerce, and
fishing, including the preservation of the tidelands "in their natural state as ecological units for
scientific study"); Town of Orange v. Resnick, 109 A. 864, 865 (Conn. 1920) (declaring that
public trust rights include "fishing, boating, hunting, bathing, taking shellfish, gathering seaweed,
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extends to periodically and recreationally navigable waters and their
tributaries,'94 adjacent wetlands,'95 artificial reservoirs and lands covered
by water caused by dams,'6 flooded lands,' 7 and groundwater.'9
cutting sedge and of passing and repassing"); Inhabitants of West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass.
(7 Allen) 158, 167 (Mass. 1863) ("It would scarcely be necessary to mention bathing, or the use
of the water for washing, or watering cattle, preparation of flax, or other agricultural uses, to all
which uses a large body of water, devoted to the public enjoyment, would usually be applied.");
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 388 (Cal. 1971) ("There is a growing public recognition that one
of the most important public uses ... is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so
that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments
which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery
and climate of the area."). But seeBell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 173 (Me. 1989) (limiting
trust rights to fishing, fowling, and navigation); Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass.
1974) (limiting trust rights to fishing and navigation).
194. See, e.g., Wilbour v. Gallagher, 462 P2d 232 (Wash. 1969); Forestier v. Johnson, 127
P. 156 (Cal. 1912); Adirondack League Inc. v. Sierra Club, 706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y 1998); Ryalls,
580 So. 2d 1140; People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Ct. App. 1971); Day v.
Armstrong, 362 P2d 137 (Wyo. 1961); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 153 N.W 1139 (Minn. 1893); see
also Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 720 n.17 (Cal. 1983) (citing People ex
re. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 157 Cal. Rptr. 815 (Ct. App. 1979); People exrel. Baker v.
Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Ct. App. 1971)) (extending public trust to nonnavigable waters above
mean high water line because diversion of these waters would affect navigable waters
downstream). But see, e.g., Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1993) (stating
that the Washington Supreme Court has "never previously interpreted the [public trust] doctrine
to extend to non-navigable waters or groundwater"); Dycus, 557 So. 2d 486 (finding that
titleholders to submerged lands were entitled to exclude public from fishing in navigable breach
in embankment even though it was connected to public lake when that connection was made
navigable only by federal dredging activities).
195. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W2d 761 (Wis. 1972); Graham v. Estuary
Props., Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981).
196. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 193 Cal. Rptr. 336 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) overruled on other grounds by Hubbard v. Brain, 785 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1990); Fogerty v.
State, 231 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Sorensen, 271 N.W 234 (Iowa 1937); State v.
Parker, 200 S.W 1014 (Ark. 1918); cf Golden Feather Cmty. Ass'n v. Thermalitos Irrigation
Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Ct. App. 1989).
197. See, e.g., Bohn v Albertson, 238 P.2d 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951); Ark. River Comm'n v.
Echubby Lake Hunting Club, 126 S.W3d 738 (Ark. 2003).
198. See In re Water Use Permit Applications (Wai'ahole ), 9 P3d 409 (Haw. 2000)
(extending public trust to groundwater). But see Seven Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Arizona, 753 P2d
161, 165 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). One scholar recently suggested that the public trust also extends
to atmospheric resources, and the doctrine thus should be employed to control human activities
that are causing global warming. See Mary C. Wood, Nature. Trust. A Legal, Political, and
Moral Frame for Global Warming, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. RE. 577 (2007). Studies show that
global warming will impact instream flows by altering the hydrologic cycle, ultimately
amplifying the seasonal variations in stream flows and possibly diminishing long-term natural
storage capacity. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
AND WATER (Bryson Bates et al. eds. June 2008), www.ipcc.ch/pdf/technical-papers/climate-
change-water-en.pdf; T.P. Barnett et al., Potenial Impacts of a Warming Climate on Water
Availability in Snow-dominated Regions, 438 NATURE 303 (2005), available at http://www.
nature.com/nature/journal/v438/n7066/pdf/nature04141.pdf; P.C.D. Milly et al., GlobalPattern of
Trends in Stream Flow and Water Availability in a Changing Climate, 438 NATURE 347 (2005),
available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v438/n7066/pdf/nature04312.pdf; Sarah
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In Mississippi, the state's high court has expanded the purpose of
the public trust doctrine to reflect the "overall public interest and purpose
in accommodating an expanding population, commerce, tourism and
recreation."' 99 That same court noted that the "purposes of the trust have
evolved with the needs and sensitivities of the people-and the capacity
of trust properties through proper stewardship to serve those needs.""2 °
Mississippi's courts have displayed this evolution by declaring, for
example, that the public trust doctrine imposes upon the government a
duty to serve as a steward of the living resources within these
waterways."' In 1940, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated that "since
the fish ... are not the subject of private ownership until reduced to
actual possession, their ownership in the meantime so far as capable of
ownership is in the state, not as proprietor, but in its sovereign capacity,
as the representative, and for the benefit, of all its people in common."'2 2
Five decades later, the court reiterated that the title to fish "is in all the
inhabitants in the state, and no person can acquire any absolute title, as
against all others, except by capture and subjection to his own control."23
Slaughter, WaterLooms as "The Next Oil, "WATER & WASTEWATER NEWS, May 1,2008, available
at http://www.wwn-online.com/articles/61594/. For excellent discussions of broad water law
reforms necessary to counter the impacts of global warming, see, for example, Joseph W
Dellapenna, Adapting the Law of Water Management to Global Climate Change and Other
Hydropolitical Stresses, 35 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 1301 (1999); A. Dan Tarlock, How
Well Can International Water Allocation Regimes Adapt to Global Climate Change?, 15 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 423 (2000) (suggesting adaptive regional management techniques to counter the
severe droughts and floods predicted by climate change modeling).
199. Treuting v. Bridge & Park Comm'n, 199 So. 2d 627, 633 (Miss. 1967); see also
Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 124, 129 (Mass. 1909) ("[I]t would be too
strict a doctrine to hold that the trust for the public, under which the State holds and controls
navigable tide waters and the land under them, beyond the line of private ownership, is for
navigation alone. It is wider in its scope, and it includes all necessary and proper uses, in the
interest of the public.").
200. Cinque Bambini P'ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 512 (Miss. 1986); see also Ryals v. Pigott,
580 So. 2d 1140, 1150 (Miss. 1990) (asserting that defining navigability in a specific instance
"has been a function of the source and (potential) natural capacities of the waters and the public
need therefor [sic], and these have been no more static than life itself"); Sec'y of State v.
Wiesenberg, 633 So. 2d 983, 994 (Miss. 1994); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471
A.2d 355, 366 (N.J. 1984) (stating that the public trust doctrine is not "fixed or static" but one to
"be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and the needs of the public it was created
to benefit").
201. Wiesenberg,633 So. 2dat994.
202. State Game & Fish Comm'n v. Fritz, 193 So. 9, 11 (Miss. 1940). In arguably the
most prominent decision on the public trust doctrine in the nation's history, the United States
Supreme Court found the doctrine supported "a title held in trust for the people of the state that
they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of
fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties." Ill. Cent. R.R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,452 (1892).
203. Dycus, 557 So. 2d at 502. The court labeled the right to fish "prominent among the
federal sovereign's public purposes" in preserving trust lands for public use. Id. at 486-93.
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The court went on to declare that Mississippi "has long identified fishing
as among the uses to which public waters have been and shall forever
remain dedicated.
'204
Mississippi broadened the traditional trust rights of the public to
specifically include recreational uses such as swimming and boating.215
In addition, the state's high court determined that, at least for purposes of
admiralty jurisdiction, the trust applies to the nonnavigable portions of
navigable inland waterways along with those influenced by the tide.06
The court stated:
Over the years [the] purposes [of the trust] have come to include navigation
and transportation; commerce, fishing, bathing, swimming and other
recreational activities; development of mineral resources, environmental
protection and preservation; the enhancement of aquatic, avarian and
marine life, sea agriculture and no doubt others. 7
The next Part contends that these broad pronouncements on the
state's public trust doctrine position the doctrine as an independent
operative and potential authority to require the state as trustee to exercise
its duties to serve the "needs'and sensitivities" of the day with respect to
instream flow preservation.0 8
204. Id at 498; see also Ryals, 580 So. 2d at 1147; Cinque BambiniPhip, 491 So. 2d at
515. As trustee of the fishes, states have statutory and regulatory authority under their police
powers to preserve and regulate fishery resources. See generally Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., 431
U.S. 265, 284-85 (1977) (defining states' public trust authority in terms of preserving resources
for the benefit of the public, as opposed to proprietary ownership of such resources); Smith v.
Maryland (The Volant), 59 U.S. 71, 75 (1855) ("The State holds the propriety of this soil [below
the low-water line] for the conservation of the public rights of fishery thereon, and may regulate
the modes of that enjoyment so as to prevent the destruction of the fishery. In other words, it may
forbid all such acts as would render the public right less valuable, or destroy it altogether."). A
Mississippi statute confirms that all citizens have the right to fish and engage in water sports on
public waterways. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 51-14 (West 2008). While state codification
concerning the exploitation of fisheries most often regulates fish of commercial interest or for
nutritional quality, these more common legislative responses do not diminish the states' obligation
as trustees of preserving the ecological integrity of all aquatic life.
205. See Treuting v. Bridge & Park Comm'n of City of Biloxi, 199 So. 2d 627 (Miss.
1967) (addressing Mississippi statute that allows lease or sale of public lands only when such
lease or sale would not affect public's recreational uses); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-27-8
(stating that "swimming, boating, or other recreation" are traditionally protected public uses).
206. See Cinque Bambini P'ship, 491 So. 2d at 515. The United States Supreme Court
ultimately upheld this decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988).
Mississippi's Mineral Lease Commission had leased oil and gas rights in tidelands to Saga
Petroleum U.S., Inc., which belonged to Cinque Bambini Partnership and Phillips Petroleum
Company. See Cinque BambiniPihip, 491 So. 2d at 511.
207. See CinqueBambiniPshMip, 491 So. 2d at 512 (internal citations omitted).
208. See suprm note 200 and accompanying text.
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V THE PUBLIC TRUST: AN INDEPENDENT OPERATIVE To PROTECT
INSTREAM FLOWS
The principle of preventing degradation of public trust uses by
upstream activities is evident in case law dating back to the nineteenth
century. For example, in 1884, a California court upheld an injunction
prohibiting upstream hydraulic mining that silted downstream rivers, in
light of the resultant flooding and navigation impediments."M Academic
literature is rich with debate over the proper role of the public trust
doctrine with respect to instream flow management in western states with
appropriative rights regimes.2 '  However, many scholars question the
vitality of the public trust for instream flow management in regulated
riparian states."'
Nonetheless, in a series of decisions beginning in 2000, the
Supreme Court of Hawai'i for the first time offered a glimpse into the
potential independent operation of the public trust doctrine in a
jurisdiction with a regulated riparian system."' The high court of Hawai'i
in Wai'ahole I declared that the preservation of waters in their natural
state is a protected use within the state's common law public trust, and
the doctrine must be considered in water allocation decisions beyond the
considerations set forth in the state's water code."3 The decision has
come to be both praised as "seminal and long overdue" as a legal source
for environmental protection"' and simultaneously criticized as "the most
far-reaching extensions of the public trust doctrine," impinging on the
209. See People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152 (Cal. 1884); see also People v.
Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P 374 (Cal. 1897) (declaring public trust to encapsulate the protection of
fish in nonnavigable waters).
210. For a sampling of academic literature on the public trust doctrine in appropriative
rights jurisdictions, see sources cited supra note 15.
211. See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 98, § 9.05(b) (contending Wai'ahole I does not
explain what the public trust doctrine adds to terms of state water code); David L. Callies &
Calvert G. Chipchase, Water Regulation, Land Use and the Environment 30 U. HAw. L. REv. 49(2007) (advocating that water is only a component of land use, not the primary concern, and
asserting that Wai'ahole Iupset the balance between land use and water law); Callies & J. David
Breemer, Selected Legal and Policy Trends in Takings Law: Background Principles, Custom and
Public Trust "Exceptions" and the (Mis)-Use of Investment-Backed Expectations; 36 VAL. U.L.
REV 339 (2002) (suggesting broad public trust pronouncements will reduce private commercial
investment in water uses in light of an indeterminate number of future pronouncements). But see
Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawaii's Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 16,
at 61 (statement of Joseph L. Sax) (arguing that similar investment-stifling concerns raised after
the Mono Lake decision have not been realized).
212. In re Water Use Permit Applications ( Wai'ahole ), 9 P3d 409 (Haw. 2000); In re
Water Use Permit Applications ( Wai'ahole I, 93 P3d 643 (Haw. 2004).
213. Wai'aholeI, 9P3dat454.
214. See Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawai'i's Public Trust
Doctrine, supra note 16, at 74 (statement of Colin Kippen).
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fundamental separation of powers among the three branches of
government.215
The Wai'ahole Idecision has been attacked for lacking standards as
to exactly what constitutes public trust resources, uses, and values."'
Still, this Article suggests it provides a framework for potential
application of trust principles in other regulated riparian jurisdictions
independent of the states' administrative water codes, though not without
significant constitutional questions that must be addressed in any
application.
This Part constructs and applies this conceptual approach reliant
upon the public trust doctrine as an independent source for demanding a
proactive method to protect instream flows that would supplant
Mississippi's current policy and help avoid the ecological degradation
that many drought-stricken eastern states now face. Subpart A provides
background information on the recent lawai'i Supreme Court opinion in
Wai'ahole I, which serves to introduce the framework addressed in
Subparts B and C.
Subpart B contends that for the public trust doctrine to play a
significant role in a regulated riparian state, Wai'ahole !indicates that the
state's courts must: (1) show a willingness to adopt a higher level of
scrutiny when public trust resources are at stake than the traditional
deference afforded to agency decisions, (2) recognize that the state's
codification of the trust by state statute or regulatory code does not
eradicate or subsume any function for common law public trust
principles, and (3) regard the doctrine as a mandatory obligation as
opposed to a voluntary authority.
Subpart C first analyzes the response of the Mississippi legislature
and judiciary to the landmark United States Supreme Court holding in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mssissppi1 7 which clarified the scope of the
public trust doctrine and recognized its evolving nature. The Subpart
then suggests that recent Mississippi case law may comport with the
conceptual framework espoused in the Hawai'i decision and discussed in
Subpart B, arguably setting forth an affirmative duty on behalf of the
state, independent of its current water code, to expand the protection of
instream trust resources.
215. Callies & Breemer, supm note 211, at 357 (labeling the Wai'ahole I decision a
judicial "rewriting [of] Hawaii's legislatively crafted water code").
216. See Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawai'i's Public Trist
Doctrine, supra note 16, at 43 (statement of Ken Kupchak).
217. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
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Subpart D broadly poses some of the important constitutional
questions surrounding the separation of powers, takings jurisprudence,
and standing, all of which state courts would need to address in
implementing the conceptual framework set forth in this Part.
A. Background on the Wai'ahole IDecision
The water dispute at issue involved the suitable allocation of nearly
twenty-seven million gallons per day that had been diverted since the
1920s by the Wai'ahole ditch system.2 ' The system, a twenty-five-mile-
long tunnel, channeled fresh surface water and dike-impounded ground
water from the natural waters on the windward side of the Ko'olau
mountain range on Oahu to irrigate sugar plantations on the more arid
leeward side."9 The irrigation structure's diversions reduced the natural
flows of several streams on the windward side, "affecting the natural
environment and human communities dependent upon them.' 220
The demise of the sugar industry in 1993 led the private owner of
the irrigation system, Wai'ahole Irrigation Company (Company), to file a
water use permit application to the State Commission on Water Resource
Management (Commission) seeking to protect its distribution of water to
existing users.22' The City of Honolulu, Hawai'i, along with several local
and private interested organizations, saw this as an opportunity for the
reallocation of longstanding apportionments and sought permission from
the Commission to reserve water.2 2 Additionally, organizations on the
windward side filed petitions to increase the minimum flow standards for
123
streams. -
After allegations that the Company was simply disposing of the
diverted water previously utilized by the sugar cane farms, the parties
reached an interim agreement where this "surplus" water would remain
on the windward side . 4 The Commission ultimately held combined
hearings for over twenty interested parties.225
The complex administrative hearings lasted over six months. 6 In
1997, the Commission issued a 257-page order that required lowering the
218. Wai'ahole, 9 P.3d at 423.
219. Id
220. Id
221. Id
222. Id
223. Id at 424.
224. The court later noted this caused "immediate apparent positive effects on the stream
ecology" on the windward side. Id
225. Id at 425.
226. Id at 424-26.
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amount of water diverted to the leeward side, leaving some water in
reserve for future state permitting authorizations for agricultural
purposes and denying certain proposed use applications, including those
for a golf course and specific residential landscaping, though allowing
some continued flow for commercial and other offstream uses.227 Ten
parties appealed to the Hawai'i Supreme Court, which issued a 102-page
opinion in 2000.228
B. Lessons of Wai 'ahole Ifor OtherRegulatedRipaian Jutsdictions
The decision of the Hawai'i Supreme Court focused on the public
trust doctrine, citing the state's longtime trust obligation "to maintain the
purity and flow of [her] waters for future generations. 229  One
commentator described the court's definition of the public trust as an
"intragenerational, as well as intergenerational, equity doctrine."
230
In addition to addressing the strong historical roots of the state's
public trust doctrine, the Wai'ahole Icourt established three fundamental
principles to support a role for the doctrine in instream. flow protection in
regulated riparian states.23' As addressed in Subparts 1 through 3 below,
the court: (1) showed a willingness to adopt a higher level of scrutiny
when public trust resources are at stake than the traditional deference
afforded to agency decisions, (2) dictated that the public trust doctrine
operates independently of the state's codification of the trust by state
statute or regulatory code, and (3) regarded the doctrine as a mandatory
obligation as opposed to a voluntary authority.
2 32
1. A Higher Level of Scrutiny When Trust Resources Are at Stake
In Wai'ahole I, the Hawai'i high court indicated at the outset that it
would uphold the Commission's findings of fact unless they were
"clearly erroneous" or otherwise unsubstantiated by the evidence.233
Nonetheless, the court took a detailed interest in examining the
Commission's factual findings and a "close look" at the decision to
227. Id. at 428-30.
228. In accord with the Hawai'i State Water Code, contested case hearings are appealed
directly to the Supreme Court. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 174C-60 (1997).
229. Wai'ahole , 9 P.3d at 441 (quoting Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P2d 287, 310 (Haw.
1982)).
230. See Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawai'i's Public Trust
Doctrine, supra note 16, at 37 (statement of Timothy Johns) (asserting that trust resources must be
distributed equally today and preserved for future generations).
231. Wai'ahole,9 P.3dat409.
232. Id
233. Id.at431.
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determine whether the water allocations complied with the public trust
doctrine, ultimately remanding to the Commission for further findings."4
The court criticized portions of the evidentiary record, along with
elements of the Commission's methodology, in vacating a number of
water allocations.23 Citing the significance of the trust in Hawai'i, the
Supreme Court declared, "[T]he ultimate authority to interpret and
defend the public trust ... rests with the courts.... .,236 When the case
returned to the court in 2004, the court again looked at the Commission's
findings using a strict standard of review, despite language in the opinion
to the contrary, in declaring that the Commission's strengthened
protections for the public trust nonetheless were erroneous.3 7
2. The Public Trust Doctrine Overrides Attempted Codification of the
Trust
In addition to addressing the common law roots of the public trust
doctrine, the court also cited to the state's Constitution, which, following
the 1978 Constitutional Convention, declared:
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political
subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all
natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources,
and shall promote the development and utilization of these resources in a
manner consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-
sufficiency of the State.23
Hawai'i's Constitution went on to state, "All public natural resources are
held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people.""23
234. Id at 458-72; see also Jan Stevens, Applying the Public Trust Docetine to River
Protection, in 4 CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 2005, at 393 (2005), available at http://www.
waterplan.water.ca.gov/docs/cwpu2005/vol4/vbl4-environment-applyingpublictrustdoctrine.pdf
(suggesting whether application of public trust to water rights "imposes additional mandate or
merely a 'hard look' is unsettled in California). Several commentators suggest that the higher
level of scrutiny applied in Wai'ahole I disregards the city and county planning that the
Commission is required to follow. On Oahu, these plans called for increased development on the
leeward side, and the accompanying need for water, and limited development on the windward
side. See, e.g., Callies & Chipchase, supra note 211, at 56-64, 77 (stating that it is the
Commission's role to follow planning process, not undertake land use planning itself).
235. See Wai'ahole , 9 P.3d at 470-71, 501-02. The court held that the public trust
doctrine required the Commission to make "precautionary" presumptions in favor of preventing
environmental degradation when scientific data is uncertain. Id. at 471.
236. Id at455.
237. See In re Water Use Permit Applications ( Wai'ahole 1), 93 P3d 643, 650-53 (Haw.
2004).
238. Wai'aholeI, 9 P.3d at 442 (quoting HAw. CONST. art. XI, § 1).
239. Id
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The Constitution required the state legislature to establish a water
resource management agency, which ultimately led to the establishment
of the State Water Code and the Commission to administer it.24 The
Wai'ahole Icourt found that these provisions make the protection of the
public trust a constitutional prerogative that cannot be diminished simply
by legislative or administrative action.24'
The court rejected the arguments of several parties that the State
Water Code eradicated or subsumed any role for common law public
trust principles."2 The decision asserted that the state's public trust
obligations are "an inherent attribute of sovereign authority that the
government 'ought not, and ergo, ... cannot surrender.""'2 3 Further, the
court held that public trust obligations are preserved in the Hawai'i
Constitution as a "fundamental principle of constitutional law."2"
3. An Affirmative Duty Under the Public Trust Doctrine
The Wai'ahole I court found an affirmative duty on behalf of the
State Water Commission to protect public trust resources wherever
feasible, and that these resources are presumptively protected in favor of
the public's use and enjoyment thereof."' The decision ordered the
240. See id (citing HAw. REv. STAT. § 174C-1 to -68 (1987)).
241. See id. at 444-45. Hawai'i's high court relied heavily upon the 1983 landmark
opinion by California's Supreme Court in National Audubon Society v Superior Court (Mono
Lake). See id. at 440-41 (citing Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 33 Cal. 3d
419, 447 (Cal. 1983)). In Mono Lake, the court held that the public trust doctrine imposes on the
state a duty of "continuing supervision" of trust resources in allocating consumptive water rights
to individuals and municipalities in an appropriative rights system, even where existing but
antiquated.government allocations to divert Mono Lake and its tributaries did not give the same
credence to public trust rights. Id at 447. Professor Joseph Sax has noted that there can be no
such thing as a permanent, once-and-for-all allocation of trust waters or land. See Proceedings of
the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawai'i's Public Trust Doctrine, supm note 16, at 31
(statement of Joseph L. Sax); see also Wai'ahole II, 93 P.3d 643 (declaring on remand that state
agency again had not sufficiently supported protection of trust resources in nonarbitrary manner).
242. See Wai'ahole , 9 P.3d at 441 ("[T]he king's reservation of his sovereign prerogatives
respecting water constituted much more than restatement of police powers." (internal citations
omitted)).
243. See id at 443 (quoting McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P2d 1330, 1388 (Haw.
1973)).
244. Id. at 443-44.
245. Id. at 454. Butseeid at 502-03 (Ramil., J., dissenting) ("The public trust doctrine, as
expressed in the Hawai'i Constitution and as subsequently incorporated into the Code, does not
mandate preference for instream uses or native Hawaiian rights."); Callies & Chipchase, supm
note 211, at 52-53 (contending that Wai'ahole I prioritization improperly trumped legislative
policy statements favoring economic development over protection of the natural environment).
Hawai'i's Water Code states:
The state water code shall be liberally interpreted to obtain maximum beneficial use of
the waters of the State for purposes such as domestic uses, aquaculture uses, irrigation
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restoration of significant stream flows on the windward side in order to
realize those important rights.4 6
While acknowledging the necessity of maintaining a process for
balancing of environmental costs and benefits against economic, social,
and other factors where feasible, the high court explicitly rejected the
claim that maintaining waters in their natural state represented "waste"
and declared that private economic development was not a protected trust
purpose.27 Admittedly, though the Wai'ahole Idecision clearly elevated
the status of the public trust where such a balancing test is employed, just
how high the trust is elevated in Hawai'i, as in many other states, remains
undetermined. The next Subpart looks at the state of Mississippi's public
trust jurisprudence in conjunction with the framework set forth in
Wai'ahole L
and other agricultural uses, power development, and commercial and industrial uses.
However, adequate provision shall be made for the protection of traditional and
customary Hawaiian rights, the protection and procreation of fish and wildlife, the
maintenance of proper ecological balance and scenic beauty, and the preservation and
enhancement of waters of the State for municipal uses, public recreation, public water
supply, agriculture, and navigation. Such objectives are declared to be in the public
interest.
HAW. REV STAT. § 174C-2 (2001). Professors Callies and Chipcase suggest that because econo-
mic uses are included in the first sentence of the statutory provision, those uses necessarily must
be of superior preference to those uses in the second sentence. See Callies & Chipcase, supra
note 211, at 57. However, the statute also could be interpreted as requiring ecologic afeguards
before addressing beneficial economic uses; indeed, if it is not, obtaining "maximum" beneficial
economic use could make any environmental protections in the second sentence meaningless.
See, e.g, Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 14546 (1995) (explaining tenet of statutory
construction that discourages courts from adopting a reading of a statute that renders any part of
the statute mere surplusage).
246. See Wai'ahole, 9 P3d at454.
247. Id. at 454, 468-69. Still, Hawai'i's high court found that domestic and Native
Hawaiian customary consumptive uses also garnered protection under state law. Id at 44849.
Admittedly, the decision relied upon Hawai'i's unique history, as the state inherited common law
from the Kingdom of Hawai'i in addition to that of England and the United States. Id at 442.
Further, the court explained that "the public trust may have to accommodate offstream diversions
inconsistent with the mandate of protection, to the unavoidable impairment of public instream
uses and values." Id. at 453. Indeed, the court moved back, in part, from the original decision of
the Commission, which stated that trust interests must be protected as a "categorical imperative,"
in deciding that the Commission must weigh these competing public and private uses on a case-
by-case basis. Id. at 454; see also Callies & Chipchase, supra note 211, at 68 (explaining how the
Wai'ahole I court refused to adopt the Commission's establishment of preservation as the
essential function of water use management, but rather one of several functions); Cal. Trout, Inc.
v. Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 190-94 (Ct. App. 1989) (construing statutory
requirement of "sufficient water" for preservation of fish to establish categorical priority). The
court's resort to this balancing scheme has lead some commentators to question the actual role of
the public trust doctrine in a regulated riparian state, where the state's water code already stresses
the administering agency's obligation to engage in a similar balancing test among current and
future water uses. See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 2 1, § 9.05(b). For a discussion of this
criticism, see infia note 316 and accompanying text.
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C Opening the Door for Independent Operation of the Public Trust To
Protect Instream Flows in Other Jursdictions
This Subpart posits that Mississippi's Supreme Court has shown a
willingness not only to expand the public trust beyond traditional
notions,248 but also to address the public trust in three ways that Hawai'i's
high court implicitly found essential to its holding. Subpart 1 shows an
example of the state Supreme Court adopting a higher level of scrutiny
when public trust resources are at stake than the traditional deference
afforded to agency decisions. Subpart 2 outlines a recent decision by that
same court implying that the public trust doctrine operates independently
of the state's codification of the trust. Subpart 3 addresses the Mississippi
high court's long history of regarding the doctrine as a mandatory
obligation, as opposed to a voluntary authority.
1. Exacting a Higher Level of Scrutiny
In American Sand & Gravel Co. v Tatum, 29 the Mississippi
Supreme Court seemingly redefined the traditional deference afforded to
agency decisions by affirming the reversal of a permit granted by the
MDEQ in light of public trust concerns.25° Under the relevant statute at
issue, MDEQ is responsible for achieving "an acceptable, workable
balance between the economic necessities of developing [the state's]
natural resources and the public interest in protecting our birthright of
natural beauty and a pristine environment." '25 In this instance, MI)EQ
contended that. it balanced the economic interests in development with
the preservation of the natural condition of trust resources in granting
American Sand a conditional permit to mine along a river.5 2
Landowners abutting that river filed suit, seeking to have a portion
of the river and adjacent land declared unsuitable for mining in light of,
amidst other concerns, its importance as an ecologically sensitive area.:'
The court affirmed the chancery court opinion, which had invalidated the
permit in light of the agency's failure to support its decision with
substantial evidence and comply otherwise with state statutory and
regulatory law.254 In rejecting the MDEQ's contention that American
Sand's mining project included a reclamation plan that would support
248. See supia notes 193-207 and accompanying text.
249. 620 So. 2d 557 (Miss. 1993).
250. Id. at 560, 564.
251. Id. at 559 (citing MISS. CODEANN. § 53-7-3(2) (Supp. 1991)).
252. ld. at 559-60.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 557.
2009]
362 TULANEENVRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 22:315
public trust uses, the court reminded the state of its common law
obligations, asserting that "[d]esignated state agencies must ... be more
conscientious in fulfilling their duty to protect and preserve Mississippi's
most precious natural resource[s]. ' 2"
2. Overriding Codification of the Trust
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v Mississipp,"6 the petitioners held
record title to forty-two acres of land lying beneath a bayou and several
streams."7 When the State issued oil and gas leases for the property, the
Petitioners sought to quiet title." 8 A Mississippi chancery court declared
that the State held title to these lands under the public trust doctrine, even
though they were nonnavigable, because they were adjacent to, and
tributaries of, a navigable river flowing into the Gulf of Mexico that is
influenced by the tides." 9 The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld this
decision, and, in 1988, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, not
only clarifying that the state maintains trust ownership over all lands
beneath waters subject to the tide's influence, 6 but also recognizing an
expansion of appropriate uses protected under the doctrine."'
One year later, Mississippi's Secretary of State responded to the
decision by establishing a commission to make recommendations for a
methodology to use in determining the precise tidelands boundary." The
commission's findings prompted the Mississippi Secretary of State to
recommend a mapping boundary for undeveloped areas reflective of the
state's tidal waters at the inception of Mississippi's statehood in 1817."'
However, the legislature chose 1973, the year the state adopted its
Coastal Wetlands Protection Act, as the operative boundary
determination date for undeveloped areas in enacting the Mississippi
Public Trust Tidelands Act (Tidelands Act)."
255. Id at 564. The court found. the evidence in the record did not support MDEQ's
contention that American Sand's reclamation project would involve the creation of"a pristine lake
with sandy beaches" for public trust uses. Id at 561.
256. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
257. Id at 472.
258. Id
259. Id. at 472-73.
260. Id at 484-85.
261. Id. at 482 (identifying "bathing, swimming, recreation, fishing, and mineral
development" as examples of appropriate trust uses).
262. See M. Casey Jarman & Richard McLaughlin, A Higher Public Purpose? The
Constitutionality of Mississippi Public Trust Tidelands Legislaton, 11 Miss. C.L. REv. 5, 9
(1990).
263. Seeidatll-14.
264. See MIss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7 (1990). The Act exempted development existing as
of July 1, 1973, the time of the effective date of the Coastal Wetland Protection Act. For a
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The Tidelands Act directed the Mississippi Secretary of State to
depict on a map all public trust and private coastal boundaries.265 The
state legislature declared it Mississippi public policy to
favor the preservation of the natural state of the public trust tidelands and
their ecosystems and to prevent the despoliation and destruction of them,
except where a specific alteration of specific public trust tidelands would
serve a higher public interest in compliance with the public purposes of the
public trust in which such tidelands are held.
66
The disparity between the respective baseline proposals for
undeveloped areas prompted the Mississippi Secretary of State to
challenge the constitutionality of the Tidelands Act as violative of the
state constitution's donation clause. 7
Indeed, the state legislature had acknowledged that using the 1973
boundary might gratuitously confer to private owners valuable filled land
that may have been validly claimed as part of the public trust.
26
However, the legislature asserted in the Tidelands Act that providing title
detailed discussion on the background of the controversy over the boundary for undeveloped
areas, see Jarman & McLaughlin, supm note 262, at 9-13.
265. See MIss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7.
266. Id. § 29-15-3(1) (West 2008). Similar public policy statements can be found
advocating for the preservation of coastal wetlands and "the air and waters of the state and to
protect, maintain and improve the quality thereof for public use, for the propagation of wildlife,
fish and aquatic life, and for domestic, agricultural, industrial, recreational and other legitimate
beneficial uses." Id. §§ 49-17-3, 49-27-3. Determining what constitutes a "higher purpose" and
"other legitimate beneficial uses" in Mississippi could certainly serve as fodder for additional
research. For a lengthy discussion about the early interpretations of the "higher purpose"
language in the Act, see John A. Duff & Kristen M. Fletcher, Augmenting the Public Trust: The
Secretary of State Efforts To Create a Public Trust Ecosystem Regime in Mississippi, 67 Miss.
L.J. 645, 654-57 (1998) (arguing that the Mississippi Secretary of State's exchange with a
budding casino operator of Gulf front lands for significantly more acreage for inland natural
preservation met this higher purpose).
There is considerable debate as to whether trust property is strictly inalienable, or whether
only the functionality of that trust property is inalienable. Compare, e.g., Joseph L. Sax,
Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 185, 192-
93 (1980), and John Moustakas, Group Rights in Cultural Property Justifying Strict
Inalienability, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1179, 1218 (1989), with Harry R. Bader, Antaeus and the
Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to Substantive Environmental Protection in the
Common Law, 19 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 749, 759 (1992). Nevertheless, the common modem
application of the doctrine allows for narrow circumstances in which alienation of trust resources
is appropriate. See Duff& Fletcher, supra note 266, at 680; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability
and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 931 (1985).
267. See Miss. CONST. AN.N. art. 4, § 95 ("Lands belonging to, or under the control of the
state, shall never be donated directly or indirectly, to private corporations or individuals, or to
railroad companies."). The Secretary argued that the Tidelands Act's validation of encroachments
on public trust lands prior to 1973 vests title in persons who negligently or knowingly committed
the encroachment. See Jarman & McLaughlin, supr note 262, at 26.
268. Sec'y of State v. Wiesenberg, 633 So. 2d 983, 987 (Miss. 1994).
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stability to private landowners constituted a "higher public purpose"
outweighing this possibility.269 The Mississippi Supreme Court sided
with the legislature and upheld the Tidelands Act in Secretary of State v
Wiesenberg.2
70
Some commentators rightly question the Wiesenberg decision as
improperly allowing the legislature to prioritize landowner certainty and
economic growth over the permanent depletion of the public's trust
resources.Y2 ' Nonetheless, similar to the Wai'ahole I court's reading of
Hawai'i's water code, Mississippi courts, even without the explicit
constitutional backing evidenced in Hawai'i, subsequently have
acknowledged that while the Tidelands Act represents an integration of
the public trust duties with statute-directed ecosystem management, it
does not subsume the doctrine.Y For example, since the holding in
Wiesenberg, the Mississippi Supreme Court has affirmed the Secretary
of State's broad discretion to deny the lease of public tidelands despite
approval by other state agencies with authority to determine the legality
and suitability of proposed uses of those public tidelands.2
In an even more relevant case, the state's high court in Stewart v
Hoover' recently confirmed that waters that did not appear on the
Mississippi Secretary of State's statutorily mandated original map still
may be classified as public trust tidelands if found in their natural state. 5
269. Id. at 987-88.
270. Id.; see also Columbia Land Dev., LLC v. Sec'y of State, 868 So. 2d 1006, 1014
(Miss. 2004).
271. See Duff & Fletcher, supra note 266, at 654; see also Jarman & McLaughlin, supra
note 262, at 11-14, 30, 35 n.287 (contending prior to state Supreme Court's decision in
Wiesenbeng that the Act was not in keeping with United States Supreme Court precedent in
Phillips Petroleum Co. or the Mississippi Constitution in light of fact that donation clause does
not contain exceptions for "higher public interests"); Money v. Wood, 118 So. 357, 359 (Miss.
1928) ("[T]he state, as trustee, has no right or power to dispose of such [public trust] lands ...
inconsistent with the purpose for which the trust exists."); Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs, 146 So. 291
(Miss. 1933) (invalidating conveyance of tidelands made by State Land Commissioner); Int'l
Paper Co. of Moss Point v. Miss. State Highway Dep't, 271 So. 2d 395, 398 (Miss. 1972) ("[T]he
ownership of the state was and is as trustee for the use and benefit of all the people of the state
and it is not subject to conveyances to private individuals for private purposes."); United States v.
Harrison County, 399 E2d 485 (5th Cir. 1968) (suggesting that Mississippi's donation clause
prohibits private upland owners from gaining title to artificially filled trust tidelands). But see
Treuting v. Bridge & Park Comm'n of Biloxi, 199 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1967) (validating sale of
submerged lands that promoted public trust uses despite "incidental private ownership" of fifty-
three percent of the property).
272. See, e.g., Columbia Land Dev., LLC v. Sec'y of State, 868 So. 2d 1006 (Miss. 2004).
273. Id at 1014 (confirming the Mississippi Secretary of State's denial of lease despite
Gaming Commission's approval of use of public tidelands for casino).
274. 815 So. 2d 1157 (Miss. 2002).
275. See id at 1162 (finding that legislature did not contemplate loss of public trust lands
"because of an oversight in the mapping process").
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By allowing the attributes of a watercourse to override statutory
codification of the public trust, the state supreme court implied that the
public trust operates, in part, independently of the statute's expression of
the public trust. The holding confirms that no declaration of the
legislature shall be deemed to relinquish the public's rights of access to
and use of lands and waters subject to the trust."6
3. An Affirmative Duty
Professor Dellapenna, a preeminent water law expert, contends that
the Wai'ahole I decision does not "explain how the invocation of the
public trust doctrine added anything to the terms" of the state's regulated
riparianism code, but for a fleeting reference to an "affirmative duty" that
is lessened by the court's call for balancing private consumptive
interests.277 This Article proposes that a focus on these affirmative duties
of the trustee in Mississippi dictates that there may remain a role for the
public trust in certain regulated riparian jurisdictions. As Professor
Joseph Sax explained, the Wai'ahole !holding, when viewed as "a strong
commitment to such a doctrine and a willingness in an energetic way to
see that it's enforced," can empower legislators and administrators to
move forward on some agenda items that otherwise would not have
276. In recently promulgated public access regulations, New Jersey's Department of
Environmental Protection explicitly stated what the Mississippi Supreme Court necessarily read
into the Mississippi legislature's efforts to define its trust interest and duties. See N.J. ADMIN.
CODE § 7iE-8.1 I(o) (2006) ("No authorization or approval under this chapter shall be deemed to
relinquish public rights of access to and use of lands and waters subject to public trust rights.");
see also Stevens, supra note 234 (stating that California courts have not held that statutes
codifying the trust subsume the trust such that compliance therewith necessarily constitutes
adequate compliance with trust duties). But see Envtl. Prot. & Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep't of Forestry
& Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888, 925-26 (Cal. 2008) (dividing the public trust into common law and
statutory parts, and categorizing the duty to protect wildlife under the latter); District of Columbia
v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 E2d 1077, 1083-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (acknowledging possibility of a federal
public trust in dicta, but failing to rule on city's argument that Congress delegated public trust
responsibilities regarding a river to the city by conferring on the District significant authority over
the river under federal statute, whereby the city exercises controls similar to that of a state over
navigable waters within its boundaries, because city first raised it on appeal).
277. Dellapenna, supra note 98, § 9.05(b). Indeed, Justice Ramil, in dissent, assaulted the
majority opinion for utilizing vague common law principles to trump the state's water code. See
In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 502-03 (Haw. 2000) (Ramil., J., dissenting). But
see, e.g., Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawai'i's Public Trust Doctrine,
supra note 16, at 39 (statement of Timothy Johns) (suggesting future applications of public trust
doctrine will demonstrate that the Hawai'i Supreme Court's decision in Wai'ahole Iwas "cutting
edge"); Ede, supra note 16, at 307 (suggesting the Hawai'i case may have significant influence in
expanding public trust doctrine in other jurisdictions).
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received adequate attention and "stand[] ready in the background to
make sure that [administrative agencies] do their jobs."278
The essence of the traditional relationship between the trustee and
the beneficiary is the trustee's obligation to act only in the interest of that
beneficiary.279 Clearly, the public trust doctrine must not be viewed as an
implement in the toolbox of administrators for deployment at will.
Rather, the doctrine creates an "inescapable" duty, which may go beyond
that set forth in regulated riparian statutes, by requiring administrators to
consider the impact of state actions on public trust interests and to act
when private decisions impair those interests."' Professor Sax recently
said, "[T]he effective question [a] court has to ask itself is: Did the
agency in question act affirmatively to implement the duty that it had?"2 '
In Mississippi, what is the "agency in question" serving as trustee?
The state legislature delegated the trust administration responsibilities to
a state land commissioner in 1892, then transferred these obligations to
the Mississippi Secretary of State nearly a century later in 1980.282
Nonetheless, commentators have noted that the Governor and the state
legislature remain the trustee of public lands, and the Secretary merely
serves under their direction.283 In 1994, the Mississippi Supreme Court
equated the Secretary's office to a "tool in the implementation" of the
trust responsibilities and described the trust duty as
the Legislature and the Secretary of State are charged not only with
maintaining title to trust properties in the State's name, but they have a
higher duty. This duty being to continuously seek avenues for proper and
278. Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawai'i's Public Trust Doctrine,
supm note 16, at 60 (statement of Joseph L. Sax).
279. See, e.g., Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1, 6 (Miss. 1989) ("At common law, one who
holds as trustee is prohibited from giving away, appropriating to his own use, or otherwise,
disposing of the corpus of a trust in derogation of the rights of beneficiaries."); AMY M. HESS &
GEORGE G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1, at 5 (rev. 3d ed. 2008).
280. See Sarah K. Kam, Biopimcy in Paradise?" Fullling the Legal Duty To Regulate
Bioprospecting in HawaP, 28 U. HAw. L. REv. 387, 408-14 (2005); see also The Public Trust
Doctune and Rpatian and Appropriative Water Rights, State and Public Interest Perspectives,
supra note 1, at 39 (statement of Mark Sinclair); Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on
Managing Hawai'i's Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 16, at 31 (statement of Joseph L. Sax).
281. Joseph L. Sax, Transcript, Environmentandlts MortalEnemy: The Rise and Decline
of the PropertyRi'hts Movement, 28 U. HAw. L. REv. 7, 18 (2005).
282. See Turney v. Marion County Bd, of Educ., 481 So. 2d 770, 776 (Miss. 1985); MiSS.
CODE ANN. §§ 7-11-2, -11 (1991); id. §§ 29-1-1, -15-7, -15-9 (1997); see also Duff & Fletcher,
supra note 266, at 665-70 (surveying Mississippi and other states' delegations of supervisory
powers over trust property). While the State can delegate some of her public trust power, as the
Mississippi legislature has delegated some power to the Mississippi Secretary of State, the State
cannot abdicate these powers and responsibilities. PUTrrNG THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE To
WORK, supranote 153, at 277.
283. See Duff& Fletcher, supra note 266, at 672.
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effective management of the public trust so that there is a return to the
public of use, environmental protection and advancement and, in the
appropriate areas, a return of economic growth.2"
The state's high court also has said that the purposes of the trust
"evolve with the needs and sensitivities of the people""2 5 and "expanding
population, commerce, tourism and recreation.""2 6 In Mississippi, the
trustee of public lands has an explicit duty to manage the trust corpus in
a productive way that reasonably maximizes its environmental, and,
where appropriate, economic benefits."7 The Hawai'i Supreme Court
appeared to elevate ecosystem protection above some other trust uses by
creating a rebuttable presumption in favor of ecologic interests."'
Similarly, the Mississippi statute can be interpreted to qualify the status
of economic growth on the priority scale by relegating such growth to
those appropriate areas only after effective environmental protection.
D Constitutional Challenges Facing Those States Considering
Independence for the Trust
While the public trust doctrine potentially could serve a new,
prominent role in protecting instream flows in Mississippi and other
regulated riparian states, implementing the framework discussed above
likely would take creative litigation that would face considerable, though
not necessarily insurmountable, constitutional roadblocks. While these
issues are generally beyond the scope of this Article (as are many
procedural hurdles that potential litigants conceivably might face
including 'the requisite burden of proof, standard of review, and
alternative remedies), this Subpart poses some of the important
constitutional questions which state courts would need to address
284. Sec'y of State v. Wiesenberg, 633 So. 2d 983, 993-94, 997 (Miss. 1994) (emphasis
added). Limitations are placed on conveyances of public trust property from the state to
individuals: legislative authority must be clear and consistent with State and Federal
Constitutional strictures, the conveyance must further public trust purposes, and remaining trust
property must not be impaired. PUTrING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE To WORK, supra note 153,
at 277.
285. Cinque Bambini P'ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 509, 512 (Miss. 1986).
286. Treuting v. Bridge & Park Comm'n, 199 So. 2d 627, 633 (Miss. 1967).
287. See Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1, 6 (Miss. 1989) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 181 (1959)) (referring to "continuing nature of the trustee's duty to manage the trust
corpus so that the [benefits] therefrom [are] reasonably maximized"); see also PROCEEDINGS OF
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION To PROTECTING INSTREAM FLOWS, supra note
1, at 7 (statement of Joseph L. Sax).
288. For a discussion of the strength of this rebuttable presumption and what component of
state government should determine it, see bfnia notes 233-247 and accompanying text.
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surrounding the separation of powers, takings jurisprudence, and the
doctrine of standing.
1. Separation of Powers
The legislature can demand that administrators protect fishery
resources and require full disclosure on how they reach water use
decisions affecting trust resources. But beyond that, while scientists have
confirmed that 7Q0 is inadequate in that it significantly threatens the
very survival of aquatic species, Wai'ahole I and other modem public
trust decisions provide little guidance as to what specific stream flow is
adequate.289
How elevated is the trust after Wai'ahole ? The Hawai'i Supreme
Court stated that it was "neither feasible nor prudent" to prioritize water
uses, 29 and instead framed trust uses as presumptively favored, which can
be overcome only when private interests meet a high burden.2 ' However,
the embedded framework in Wai'ahole 1, applied above to Mississippi's
public trust doctrine case law in the context of instream flow protections,
effectively did address the primacy of ecologic interests, which implicitly
raises the concept of reaching an environmental threshold before
considering economic interests in any balancing test. Indeed, the dissent
in Wai'ahole I understood the majority opinion as an implicit
prioritization, stating, "It is ... apparent that by engrafting [trust]
obligation[s] into the Hawai'i Constitution, the framers did not intend to
prioritize Uses; they reserved that matter for the legislature.
292
289. See, e.g., Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawai'i's Public Trust
Doctrine, supra note 16, at 43 (statement of Ken Kupchak).
290. See In re Water Use Permit Applications ( Wai'ahole 1), 9 P.3d 409, 454 (Haw. 2000)
("Given the diverse and not necessarily complementary range of water uses, even among public
trust uses alone, we consider it neither feasible nor prudent to designate absolute priorities
between broad categories of uses under the water resources trust.").
291. Id.
292. See id. at 506 (Ramil, J., dissenting). Justice Ramil further asserted that the majority
allowed the Commission to exceed its authority, stating that the holding "transgress(es) the
separation of powers doctrine by allowing an executive agency to transcend its statutory authority
and usurp the legislature's lawmaking function under the guise of enforcing the agency's
interpretation of what the 'public trust' demands." Id at 508; see also, e.g., City of Waterbury v.
Town of Washington, 800 A.2d 1102, 1137 (Conn. 2002) ("[Wlhen there is an environmental
legislative and regulatory scheme in place that specifically governs the conduct ... whether the
conduct is unreasonable under [the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act] will depend on
whether it complies with that scheme."). But see Mayland, supra note 17, at 698 (criticizing
Waterbury as effectively holding that "no matter how ecologically damaging an activity may be,
as long as it complies with poorly crafted state or local regulations, it apparently cannot be
challenged").
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Even assuming the Wai'ahole I majority's broad view of the
judiciary's role, few would contend it is the courts' charge to suggest or
mandate a return to "natural flow," a minimum flow, or a seasonally
fluctuating standard. But Wai'ahole I does generate debate as to who
actually determines the place of the environment on the priority scale
among the many uses at stake in water management. Is it the courts' job
to take a "close look" at state actions293 or even to define an ecologic
threshold for balancing other competing uses, leaving the subsequent
balancing to the legislature?
Wai'ahole I seems to echo, in part, United States Supreme Court
Justice William 0. Douglas's interpretation of the courts' role as a
corrective force in the face of inadequate or improvident actions by
governmental agencies with respect to trust resources." However, if the
courts continually make these balancing determinations, there is the risk
they could lose their independence as a check on the legislature and the
executive under the Constitution's basic separation of powers doctrine. It
is fair to query why individual voters and interest groups would seek
action from their legislatures if the ultimate balancing decision will be
made by the courts. Is this phenomenon already playing itself out in
some environmental contexts, particularly in states, like Mississippi, with
elected judiciaries and the associated lengthy, policy-driven election
campaigns?
2. The Takings Clause
Regardless of which entity of government makes a decision to give
greater weight to environmental concerns over private uses, the Takings
Clause is sure to rear its head. Nonetheless, private interests in real
293. Wai'ahole , 9 P3d at 456 (majority opinion) ("[T]his court will take a 'close look' at
the action to determine if it complies with the public trust doctrine and it will not act merely as a
rubber stamp for agency or legislative action."). The Wai'ahole Icourt also stated, "[T]he state
may compromise public rights in the [water] resource pursuant only to a decision made with a
level of openness, diligence, and foresight commensurate with the high priority these rights
command under the laws of our state."). Id at 455; see also, e.g., In re State Water Res. Control
Bd. Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 272 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior
Court (Mono Lake), 33 Cal. 3d 419, 446-47 (1983)) (finding that when the state approves
appropriations of water "despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses," "the state must bear in
mind its duty as trustee to consider the effect of the taking on the public trust, and to preserve, so
far as consistent with the public interest, the uses protected by the trust").
294. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 745-50 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(stating that governmental agencies charged with protecting the environment "are notoriously
under the control of powerful interests who manipulate them through advisory committees, or
friendly working relations, or who have that natural affinity with the agency" and it is the courts'
task to hear "the voice of the existing beneficiaries of these environmental wonders" if the
agencies do not).
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property generally are recognized as stronger than any interests in
water.9 And because the takings doctrine is founded on the principle of
fairness, such that individuals are not shouldering burdens that should be
borne by the public at large, requiring all water users to safeguard
ecosystems arguably does not single out anyone.296
In Wai'ahole I, the Hawai'i Supreme Court rejected a takings
challenge concerning the exercise of public trust rights over groundwater,
holding that the state assumed the duty to protect those lands and waters
long before the formation of individual property rights, and private
interests cannot claim a vested right to them.297 Because the plaintiffs
never claimed absolute entitlement to the water, any permitted diversions
remained impressed with public trust rights.9 Therefore, the court
implied, there was no taking, based on the state's predictable, settled
background principles of common law public trust property.
2 99
, Professor Sax has noted that the United States Supreme Court
ultimately would look at state law as the critical factor in determining
whether reliance upon the public trust for instream flow protection will
295. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945)
("Rights, property or otherwise, which are absolute against all the world are certainly rare, and
water rights are not among them."); Pratt v. State Dep't of Natural Res., 309 N.W2d 767, 772
(Minn. 1981) (finding water rights incapable of private ownership); Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249,
252 (1853) ("[T]he right of property in water is usufructuary, and consists not so much of the
fluid itself as the advantage of its use.... The right is not in the corpus of the water, and only
continues with its possession."); Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 638 P2d 1324, 1328
(Ariz. 1981) (declaring usufructuary right afforded weaker constitutional protections under
takings clause than other types of property). But see Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States,
543 E3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding in a 2-1 decision that the federal government must pay
just compensation to regulate diversions of water for wildlife protection purposes under federal
Endangered Species Act, if plaintiffs prove ownership of the water); Tulare Basin Water Storage
Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. CI. 313 (2001) (holding that a reduction in water deliveries
mandated by the Endangered Species Act was a taking of property requiring compensation under
the United States Constitution); Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. CI. 147, 172 (1996) (asserting that
water rights are subject to same degree of protection under Fifth Amendment as rights to real
property).
296. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
297. Wai'ahole, 9 P.3d at 492-95.
298. Id.
299. See id at 494 ("[T]he reserved sovereign prerogatives over the waters of the state
precludes the assertion of vested rights to water contrary to public trust purposes."); see also, e.g.,
Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawai'i's Public Trust Doctrine, supra note
16, at 40 (statement of William Tam) (stating that sovereign prerogatives in Hawai'i go back to
1848, lessening the takings risk in light of the Supreme Court's reference in Lucas v South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), to background principles of state property or
nuisance law already placing restrictions on private interests in land); Zachary C. Kleinsasser,
Note, The Law and Planning of Public Open Spaces: Boston s Big Dig and Beyond 32 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 421 (2005) (asserting that state dominion over public trust resources must be
considered a "background principle" under Lucas).
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result in an unconstitutional taking."°° Of course, given the diverse state
water right rules, takings challenges to the government's regulation of
private water rights have led to, and will continue to lead to, disparate
results.
It is possible that the explicit language in the regulated riparian
statute in Mississippi, declaring that the regulations are created under the
state's police power, could serve as a defense to any takings or other
constitutional claim, if the court were to require a stricter stream flow
standard than the statute, based on the state's public trust obligations."'
But can the state now claim that title to certain real property is now, and
has always been, with the state, despite state policies suggesting
differently for decades or more?02
3. Standing
In addition to the respective duties of the branches of government
and any compensation owed by the government to private property
owners for unconstitutional infringements resulting from the exercise of
those duties, one commentator stated that the public has its own
obligation-to be vigilant about protecting and acting upon their rights as
beneficiaries.3
Science suggests that policies, like 7Q,0, requiring low minimum
flows that focus on consumptive uses of water rights, will cause
irreparable harm to instream biota. But what is a citizen's role if the state
fails to remedy this harm by fulfilling its trust obligations through
legislation or administrative regulation, or via participation by a public
300. See Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawai'i's Public Trust
Doctrine, supm note 16, at 62 (statement of Joseph L. Sax) (referring to the Lucas court's
assertion that a background principle must be of "the State's law of property and nuisance").
Professor Sax suggests the ruling very well could hinge on the breadth of the public trust
doctrine, wide in states like Hawai'i, but narrow in states like Maine, New Hampshire and New
York. Id. For example, New York refused to expand the public trust doctrine to nonnavigable
waters in light of the concern for injecting uncertainty into the private property investment
market. See Douglaston Manor, Inc. v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E.2d 201, 203 (N.Y. 1997).
301. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-1 (West 2008); see, e.g., Chow v. City of Santa Barbara,
22 P.2d 5, 17 (Cal. 1933) ("It has long been established that all property is held subject to the
reasonable exercise of the police power and ... constitutional provisions declaring that property
shall not be taken without due process of law have no application in such cases.").
302. Compare, e.g., Callies & Chipchase, supra note 211, at 73 ("[T]he state has no more
power to declare that recognized water rights never really existed than it does to claim that title to
all real property is now and always has been with the state. Water rights are property rights and
cannot be taken except for a public use and upon the payment of compensation."), with Ariz. Ctr.
for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 E2d 158, 171 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) ("That generations
of trustees have slept on public rights does not foreclose their successors from awakening.").
303. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION To
PROTECTING INSTREAM FLOWS, supra note 1, at 27-28 (statement of Thomas J. Dawson).
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advocate, or the Secretary of State assuming a public advocate's role?"°
Do members of the public have standing to attempt to fulfill their duties
by seeking judicial redress for insufficient ecosystem protection?
The United States Supreme Court has taken a relatively narrow
view of standing in environmental matters,"5 and numerous scholars have
stated that the public does not, or should not, have unfettered standing to
challenge action or inaction allegedly harming trust resources."'
However, Professor Sax suggests that, absent a state statute
mandating ecosystem protections, the general public must have an
304. Of course, challenges may be available when state administrators fail to fulfill their
statutory or regulatory duties. However, as discussed supra Part II, the 7Q,0 minimum flow
standard is authorized by Mississippi's regulated riparian statute and the implementing
regulations.
305. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (defining the sole
legitimate interest in species in terms of their use as photographic or scientific objects and
dismissing claim under Endangered Species Act for lack of standing because plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate sufficient or redressable injury because plaintiffs would not return to the site to see
species at issue); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (holding that Sierra Club lacked
standing to challenge construction of ski resort as an ecologic impediment where organization did
not exhibit individualized harm to itself or its members). But see id. at 741-42 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("The critical question of 'standing' would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if
we fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal
agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or
invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage. Contemporary
public concern for protecting nature's ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of
standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own preservation."). As this Article went to
press, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Summers v Earth Island Institute,
which drastically limited the ability of private persons and conservation organizations to seek
redress for environmental wrongs. See No. 07-463, slip op. (U.S. Mar. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/O7-463.pdf. The 5-4 majority opinion, authored
by Justice Scalia, seemingly looked with disfavor upon the utilization of statistical analysis to
establish the likelihood of environmental injury, which had been recognized previously by the
federal circuit courts. See, e.g., Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 E3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(finding standing for an environmental group for which statistics revealed that two to four
members of the group would develop skin cancer from the alleged damage that unlawful
increases in methyl bromide emissions would cause to the ozone layer). Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Summers is troubling, to say the least, and could have the effect of narrowing the
broad standing requirements acknowledged in Massachusetts v EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 515-21
(2007), where Justice Kennedy supported standing.
306. See, e.g., Nathan Piwowarski, Comment, Trouble at the Water Edge: Michigan
Should Not Extend the Public Trust Doctrine of the Great Lakes, as Reinterpreted in Glass v.
Goeckel, to Its Navigable Inland Rivers and Lakes or To Grant the Public LatealAccess to Trust
Properties, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1045, 1055-56 (2006) (suggesting broad environmental
standing increases litigation and prompts inconsistent results); Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1 (2003) (noting expanding
environmental standing but concluding that politics serves as only true conservation avenue);
Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questiomng the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOwA L. REv. 631 (1986) (acknowledging private
standing under public trust doctrine to preserve environmental quality, but suggesting doctrine is
preempted by broad modem standing interpretations).
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opportunity to oblige the state to meet its continuing duties under the
public trust doctrine.3"7 There is significant support in state courts for
private citizen or organization suits alleging state and local government
violations of the public trust doctrine.3" As the Illinois Supreme Court
once noted:
If the "public trust" doctrine is to have any meaning or vitality at all, the
members of the public, at least taxpayers who are the beneficiaries of that
trust, must have the right and standing to enforce it. To tell them that they
must wait upon governmental action is often an effectual denial of the right
for all time.3°9
307. See also PROCEEDINGS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION To
PROTECTING INSTREAM FLOWS, supra note 1, at 17 (statement of Joseph L. Sax).
308. See, e.g., Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 13-19 (Ill. 1970) (holding
that public trust doctrine allows taxpayers to challenge conversion of city parks); Marks v.
Whitney, 491 P2d 374, 381-82 (Cal. 1971) (stating that member of general public has standing to
request court to recognize and declare public trust easement on private tidelands); Gewirtz v. City
of Long Beach, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495, 501-03 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (holding that state resident has
standing to dispute city ordinance restricting beach access); Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 88 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973) (permitting taxpayers to challenge expansion of highway into public common
area); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W2d 457, 458-
59 (N.D. 1976) (holding that public trust doctrine allows citizens to seek injunction on issuance of
future water permits); Superior Pub. Rights, Inc. v. State Dep't of Natural Res., 263 N.W2d 290,
292 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (declaring that nonprofit corporation whose members were residents
may seek to invalidate agreements that permitted private use of public trust lands); City of
Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P2d 362, 363-64 (Cal. 1980) (holding that corporation and
individual have standing to quiet title and determine whether land is free of public trust interests);
Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. State ex rel Andrus, 899 P2d 949, 953-55 (Idaho 1995) (holding
that public trust doctrine conferred standing to environmental group to challenge timber sale on
state lands because sedimentation from logging would harm fish spawning grounds and
appurtenant creek bed); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588
(Ct. App. 2008) (finding that private parties have standing to bring an action to enforce protection
of wildlife public trust resources); Marc R. Poirier, New Jerseys Public Trust Doctrine, Private
Development and Exclusion, and Shared Public Uses of Natural Resources, 15 SOUTHEASTERN
ENVTL. L.J. 71, 114 (2006) (noting continuation of broad environmental standing with respect to
public trust over past two decades); Serena M. Williams, Sustaining Urban Green Spaces." Can
Public Parks Be Protected Under the Public Trust Doctrine?, 10 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 23 (2002);
Deveney, supra note 159, at 23-25 (describing individuals' rights under Roman law to seek
"popular injunctions" in effort to protect public rights on and along public waters). In the 1970s,
Christopher Stone, and several others since, made the rather zealous claim for standing rights of
nature itself. See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standng?-Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450, 456 (1972) (advocating legal standing for "forests,
oceans, rivers and other so-called 'natural objects' in the environment" via appointed guardians);
Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Revisited- How Far Will Law and Morals
Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 9 (1985) (advocating a "moral pluralism"
that supports the provision of legal rights to unconventional entities). But see, e.g., Bertram C.
Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surface Waterways and Submerged Lands of the Great
Lakes States, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 907, 985 (2007) (stating that individuals do not have
inherent standing rights under public trust doctrine in Indiana, Minnesota, and Ohio).
309. Paepcke, 263 N.E.2dat 18.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The public trust doctrine may have untapped potential as an
independent source for preserving instream flows in a regulated riparian
jurisdiction, such as Mississippi, where the judiciary has shown a
willingness to adopt a higher level of scrutiny when public trust
resources are at stake, recognized that the state's codification of the trust
does not subsume any function for common law trust principles, and
considered the exercise of authority under the doctrine as a mandatory
obligation. This Part returns to the foundational structure of regulated
riparian systems-effectively and efficiently managing, protecting, and
utilizing water resources amidst competing uses-in forecasting what
may remain of a balancing approach should a state court in a regulated
riparian jurisdiction choose to follow this conceptual approach derived
from Waiahole I
Implementing this framework surely does not negate the need for
any balancing of ecological benefits with economic uses. The public
trust, of course, should not and cannot transform our post-industrial
economy to one of complete natural preservation.3 As one scholar
explains, "Ourlegal institutions do indeed require a tolerable amount of
'uncertainty' to make room for public deliberation and successful
adaptation to changed circumstances.'3 1
However, land and water are employed almost exclusively in ways
that degrade nature, and today's "public interest". balancing tests"2
continue to weigh disproportionately in practice against the "salutary
guidelines"3 '3 of the public trust in favor of consumptive uses. While the
concept of "public interest" at times can complement the public trust,
some commentators suggest that actions taken in the public interest often
impair the trust by predominantly focusing on present economic and
310. Joseph L. Sax, The UnfinishedAgenda ofEnvironmentalLaw, 14 HASTINGS W-NW.
J. ENvTL. L. & PoL'Y 1,4-5 (2008).
311. Michael Warburton, Toward Greater Certainty in Water Rpghts? Public Interests
Require Inherent "Uncertainty" To Support Constitutional Governance of Our States Water, 36
MCGEORGE L. REV. 139, 163 (2005); see also Jan Stevens, Applying the Public Trust Doctrine to
River Protection, CALEFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 2005, supra note 234 (asserting that the Mono
Lake decision in California recognized that test to be applied in water allocation is not as stringent
as that applicable to attempted alienation of beds of navigable waters).
312. See, e.g., In reState Water Resources Control Bd. Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 277
(Ct. App. 2006) ("[I]n determining whether it is 'feasible' to protect public trust values like fish
and wildlife in a particular instance, the Board must determine whether protection of those
values, or what level of protection, is 'consistent with the public interest.").
313. See Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawai'i's Public Trust
Doctrine, supra note 16, at 62 (statement of Jan Stevens).
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consumptive considerations, as opposed to common property benefits to
both present and future generations."'
As statutory law has recognized, for example, that industrial
wastewater can no longer be discharged without controls in light of
proven human health effects, so too must legislatures, and if not the
legislatures, the courts, recognize that protecting aquatic habitats
deserves those same protections." ' The corpus of the trust, including
riverine resources, has to be preserved, and diminishing biodiversity must
be respected as a serious threat to continued health and prosperity.16
The Wai'ahole I decision directed natural resource managers to
ensure the long-term health of a wide range of trust resources.
Forthcoming users, however, cannot express their interests today.
Healthy fish populations are indicators of healthy waters, and the
protection of instream flows is the only way to preserve water
314. See ANNEAR ET AL., supra note 12, at 63; PUrING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE To
WORK, supra note 153, at 277. For example, Mississippi's public trust obligations are clouded by
the economic benefits flowing from the institution of legal gaming along the Gulf Coast in the
early 1990s. SeeMISS. CODEANN. § 75-76-1 to 76-313 (Supp. 1997); Miss. CODEANN. § 97-33-
1 (1994); see also Timothy M. Mulvaney, Tnial Court Disallows Proposal To Construct Luxury
Resort and Conference Center on Alabama Coast, 28 WATER LOG 6, 6-7 (Aug. 2008) (describing
similar phenomenon regarding waterfront gaming in Alabama).
315. SeeSax,supranote310,at8.
316. See, e.g., Harrison C. Dunning, A Short Tribute to Joe Sax, 14 HASTINGS W-Nw. J.
ENvTL. L. & PoL'Y 19, 21 (2008) (citing Joseph Sax, Binging an Ecological Perspective to
Natural Resources Law: Fulfilling the Promise of the Public Trust in NATURAL RESOURCES
POLICY AND LAW-TRENDS AND DIRECTIONS (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F Bates eds.,
1993) ("[L]egal and managerial institutions are going to have to start ... learning to manage
[ecosystems] to meet both the needs of the conventional economy and those of what might be
called the economy of nature-where rivers produce fish, forests provide wildlife habitat, and
wetlands remain biologically productive.")). However, some scholars suggest that ecosystem-
based interests deserve only tempered consideration when measured against human consumption
and economic interests. See, e.g., Callies & Chipchase, supra note 211, at 49 (asserting that the
Wa'ahole Idecision distorted traditional balancing between land use and water by implementing
a "communitarian regime" where water is preserved for uses such as minimum stream flows);
George P. Smith II & Michael W Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law.,
Emanations Within a Penumbr, 33 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. Ra. 307, 342-43 (2006) (concluding that
"rarely can it be shown that the benefits of resource preservation outweigh the economic concerns
of property owners" and thus "any expansion of the [public trust] doctrine should be slow and
scrutinized to the highest degree and with a spirit ofjudicial restraint").
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management options for those future generations."7 Indeed, these rivers
and streams often "can only be spent once."3 '8
The time to be proactive about instream flows in Mississippi is now
in light of increased diversions for irrigation, population rise, droughts in
neighboring states, and the grim outlook regarding increased seasonal
variations in watercourses due to global warming. Any hesitation will
put Mississippi in the reactive position of so many other states."9 The
Wai'ahole I court concluded that inattention to the "basic, modest
principle that use of the precious water resources of our state must
ultimately proceed with due regard for certain enduring public rights ...
may have brought short-term convenience to some in the past. But ...
we can ill-afford to continue down this garden path this late in the day."32
A reassessment of traditional relationships between water devoted to
diversionary consumptive uses and instream preservation is in order, and
it may take motivated trust beneficiaries to initiate this reassessment
through litigation.2 '
317. See ANNEAR ET AL., supra note 10, at 84; Am. Sand & Gravel Co. v. Tatum, 620 So.
2d 557, 564 (Miss. 1993) (quoting D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND 3 (1971))
(noting that agencies designated to administer the trust must heed a wise American Indian
proverb: "'[T]he frog does not drink up the pond in which he lives."'). But see Callies &
Chipchase, supra note 211, at 76 (arguing that Wai'ahole I destroyed predictable system for
private commercial ventures and stating "preservation for the sake of preservation ... serves
neither this nor the next generation").
318. Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 581 P2d 520, 524 (1978) ("Because the trust is for
the public benefit, the state's trustee obligation is commonly described as the protection of
specified public usages, e.g., navigation, fishery and, in more recent cases, recreation. The severe
restriction upon the power of the state as trustee to modify water resources is predicated not only
upon the importance of the public use of such waters'and lands, but upon the exhaustible and
irreplaceable nature of the resources and its fundamental importance to our society and to our
environment. These resources, after all, can only be spent once. Therefore, the law has
historically and consistently recognized that rivers and estuaries once destroyed or diminished
may never be restored to the public and, accordingly, has required the highest degree of protection
from the public trustee.").
319. See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 18, at 20-21 (suggesting fundamental changes in
water allocation law are unlikely except in response to crises as perceived by most interest
groups). While the following quoted passage explicitly refers to a western state that follows an
appropriative rights regime, it conveys the failure to move proactively to address water quantity
calamites in many parts of the country: "New Mexicans have known for years that the day of
reckoning was coming but they have repressed this unpleasant reality... [T]here is increasingly
visible evidence of the collision between explosive population growth and diminishing water
supplies." Lora Lucero & A. Dan Tarlock, Water Supply and Urban Growth in New Mexico:
Same 014 Same Old ora New Em, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 803, 817 (2003).
320. In re Water Use Permit Applications ( Wai'ahole 1), 9 R2d 409, 502 (Haw. 2000).
321. See Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawai'i's Public Trust
Doctine, supra note 16, at 39 (statement of Joseph L. Sax); see also id at 69-70 (statement of
William Devick) ("I see public trust as both a philosophy and a potential tool to shift that
thinking, to shift the balance in decision-making towards protection and conservation, thinking
about the future, rather than simple, immediate, economic advantage."). While Mississippi's
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Of course, as Professor Sax notes, the strategic problem in
creatively litigating in the public trust arena is pushing the envelope too
fast at the risk of generating decisions that actually restrict the protection
of trust resources. 22 But some might ask whether Mississippi's instream
flow protection can get much worse.
The first step in developing a confidence that the public trust
doctrine can protect these ecologic resources simply requires "a belief
that words like 'trust' ought to be taken seriously."'323 From there,
ambitious creative thought, reliant on the public trust doctrine as an
independent operative, can challenge the existing theoretical paradigm
favoring consumptive uses of Mississippi's fragile watercourses, and
possibly those in other regulated riparian states.
Public Trust Tidelands Act seemingly prioritizes ecosystem protection absent a "higher public
purpose" these "higher public purposes" remain undefined. For a further discussion of the
Tidelands Act, see infr notes 262-273 and accompanying text. Further, the current 7Q, standard
displays an utter disregard for any priority scale implied in the Tidelands Act. For a further
discussion of the documented failures of utilizing a 7Q, standard to protect aquatic habitat, see
supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
322. See Sax, supra note 287, at 17; see also PROCEEDINGS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
AND ITS APPLICATION To PROTECTING INSTREAM FLOWS, supra note 1, at 42 (statement of Richard
Roos-Collins) ("[T]he Public Trust Doctrine is a very sharp knife, and it can cut the hand of the
person who holds it.") For example, in December of 2007, the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection adopted progressive amendments to the state's public waterfront access
regulations in an effort to meet its public trust obligations as interpreted by the state's Supreme
Court. SeeN.J. Admin. Code §§ 7:7E-8.11, 8.50 (2008). Shortly thereafter, the state legislature
placed a moratorium on implementation of the new regulations under the guise of the "Public
Access and Marina Safety Task Force Act." See N.J. ADMtN. CODE § 13:19-38 to -44 (2008); see
also, e.g., Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho
1983) (rejecting an environmental group's claim that state grant of a permit application to build a
private dock on trust waters violated the trust).
323. Charles E Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 471-72 (1989).
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